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Fulfilling the U.S. Obligation to Prevent
Exterminationism: A Comprehensive Approach to
Regulating Hate Speech and Dismantling Systems of
Genocide
Sarah E. Ryan*
"The practices of genocide anywhere affect the vital interests of all
civilized people. Its consequences can neither be isolated nor localized."
- Raphael Lemkin, 19451

I. INTRODUCTION
In 1933 Raphael Lemkin, an Eastern European legal scholar and
prosecutor, proposed new international laws to prevent the
"extermination of social collectivities" 2 at the International Conference
for the Unification of Criminal Law. His proposal failed and the world
soon witnessed "crimes of barbarity" 3-Lemkin's original conception
of genocide-on a scale that even Lemkin never dreamed possible.
Following the Holocaust, Lemkin again leveraged his philological 4 and

* Assistant Professor of Communication and Research Fellow in the Sam Donaldson Center
for Communication Studies, University of Texas at El Paso (Ph.D., Scripps College of
Communication at Ohio University. 2006). The author would like to thank Carol McMahon, Esq.
and Justine Daniels, Esq. for insightful comments and contributions to this Article, Annie
Balocating for three years of project management for the Rwanda Research Group, and Chuck
Ambler and the Africa Working Group at University of Texas at El Paso for ongoing guidance
and support.
1. Raphael Lemkin, Genocide - A Modern Crime, 9 FREE WORLD, Apr. 1945, at 39.
2. Raphael Lemkin, Genocide as a Crime under International Law, 41 Am. J. INT'L L. 145,
146 (1947) [hereinafter Lemkin, Genocide as a Crime]; see also Raphael Lemkin, Akte der
Barbareiund des Vandalismus als Delicta Juris Gentium [Acts of Barbarity and Destruction that
Shock the Conscience of Nations], 19 ANWALTSBLATT INTERNATIONALES 6 (1933) [hereinafter
Lemkin, Akte der Barbarei]. available at http://www.preventgenocide.org/lemkin/madridl933english.htm.
3. See Lemkin, Akte der Barbarei,supra note 2.
4. Philology is the study of language. particularly its use and meaning within social contexts.
The art and social science is rooted in ancient studies of rhetoric. See Mikhail Bakhtin, The
Problem of the Text in Linguistics, Philology, and the Human Sciences: An Experiment in
Philosophical Analysis. in SPEECH GENRES AND OTHER LATE ESSAYS 103, 122-28 (Caryl
Emerson & Michael Holquist eds., Vern W. McGee trans., Univ. of Texas Press 1986)
(discussing the need to view utterances within their context and judge their impact on third parties
to determine their meaning).
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legal expertise in a campaign to stop the destruction of peoples. 5
Lemkin coined the term "genocide" 6 and oversaw the creation of the
United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide in 1948 ("Genocide Convention").7 Eleven years
later, he died abandoned and penniless in his adopted country, the
United States.8 More than a quarter-century passed before the U.S.
ratified a highly modified version of the Genocide Convention. 9
The reluctance of U.S. lawmakers and jurists to fully enact the
Genocide Convention-to this daylo-illustrates the prevailing
obstacles facing proponents of hate speech"
regulations and
5.

See SAMANTHA

POWER,

"A PROBLEM FROM HELL": AMERICA AND THE AGE OF

GENOCIDE 47-52 (2002) (explaining Lemkin's criticism of the Nuremburg Tribunal).
6. Genocide refers to the attempted or actual destruction of a gene pool, though Lemkin
applied the term somewhat more broadly (e.g., to campaigns targeting religious groups). Efforts
to expand the definition contained in the 1948 Genocide Convention have failed. According to
William A. Schabas, other forms of targeted extermination have been successfully prosecuted as
crimes against humanity rather than genocide:
Genocide is a crime of intentional destruction of a national. ethnic, racial and religious
group, in whole or in part.. .. This definitional provision has stood the test of time,
resisting calls for its expansion ....
The obstinate refusal to modify the definition is
not explained by some innate conservativism in the international lawmaking process.
Rather, the gaps left by the somewhat narrow definition of genocide in the 1948
Convention have been filled more or less satisfactorily by the dramatic enlargement of
the ambit of crimes against humanity during the 1990s.
William A. Schabas, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.
U.N. AUDIOVISUAL LIBRARY OF INTL L., 3 (2008), http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/pdf/ha/cppcg/
cppcg e.pdf.
7. The convention was adopted in 1948 and entered into force in 1951. See Lori Lyman
Brunn, Beyond the 1948 Convention-Emerging Principles of Genocide in Customary
InternationalLaw, 17 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 193. 204 (1993) (discussing the formation of the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide).
8. See The Totally Unofficial Man: Raphael Lemkin and the Struggle for a Genocide
Convention, ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, http://www.adl.org/education/curriculum-connections/
spring 2005/spring 2005_lesson2 lemkin.asp (last visited Dec. 15, 2011) (outlining a lesson
plan for high school students that includes this summary of Lemkin's campaign to end genocide).
9. The implementing legislation, known as the Proxmire Act, contained significant
reservations, understandings, and declarations that limited and modified U.S. obligations under
the Genocide Convention. Proxmire Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-606, § 2 (a), 102 Stat. 3045,
3046 (1988).
10. See Gregory S. Gordon. Never Say Never Again?, GENOCIDE PREVENTION Now. Winter
2010, at 1, available at http://genocidepreventionnow.org/Portals/0/docs/Gordon-GPN-YEARREV2009.pdf (noting that the sixtieth anniversary of the Genocide Convention was full of sober
reminders that its primary goal of preventing genocide has remained out of reach); see also Clint
Williamson. U.S. Efforts to Combat Genocide and War Crimes, 16 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 321.
323 (2008) (arguing that the United States can do more to combat genocide).
11. Disagreement looms over the definition of hate speech. Ronald Turner provided
numerous definitions in his 1995 essay. See Ronald Turner. Regulating Hate Speech and the
First Amendment: The Attractions of and Objections to, an Explicit Harms-BasedAnalysis, 29
IND. L. REV. 257. 257-58 n.1 (1995) (discussing how various scholars have defined the term
"hate speech"). These included Professor Gerald Gunther's topically-relevant definition of
genocide as "speech expressing hatred or bias toward members of racial, religious, or other
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preventative intervention. Accordingly, this Article looks briefly at the
struggle to realize Lemkin's life's work in the U.S., while suggesting
parallels between past challenges to the Genocide Convention and hate
speech regulations today. Noting decades of legislative and judicial
resistance to such proposals, this Article then suggests an alternative,
complementary route to realizing Raphael Lemkin's ideals-system
regulation.

II.

CHALLENGES TO THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION: AN ILLUSTRATION OF
MODERN U.S. ANTAGONISMS TOWARD HATE SPEECH AND INCITEMENT
REGULATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL JURIDICAL ARRANGEMENTS

Reservations about the Genocide Convention rest on four
grounds: definitional vagueness, doctrinal limitations, jurisdictional
objections, and geopolitical concerns. 12 First, in the years preceding the
passage of the implementation legislation, the Proxmire Act, 13 members
of both Congress and the American Bar Association ("ABA")
vociferously debated the convention's definition of genocide as the
targeting of a group for extermination.14 They questioned how many
people constitute a group and posited hypothetical scenarios in which
ethnic and racial groups were incrementally terrorized to test the bounds
of the definition.1 5 As political scientist Lawrence J. LeBlanc has
observed, these discussions descended into absurdity when "[s]trained
examples were used to illustrate the [definitional] problem, including
murder of a single individual and 'driving five Chinamen out of
town."'l 6 Absent context, these debates suggested a gross insensitivity

groups."

Id. at 258 n.I (quoting GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 134 (12th ed.

1991)). See infra notes 51-54 and accompanying text for a discussion of issues in defining "hate
speech."
12. See Lawrence J. LeBlanc, The Intent to Destroy Groups in the Genocide Convention: The
Proposed U.S. Understanding,78 AM. J. INT'L L. 369. 370 (1984) (explaining the reasons for the
controversy over interpreting Article II of the Genocide Convention, which defines genocide as
"intent to destroy, in whole or in part"); Stefan A. Riesenfeld & Frederick M. Abbott, The Scope
of U.S. Senate Control over the Conclusion and Operation of Treaties. 67 Cm.-KENT L. REV.
571, 622-28 (1991) (summarizing U.S. reservations to ratifying the Genocide Convention);
NEHEMIAH ROBINSON, THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION-ITS ORIGINS AND INTERPRETATION
(1949) (describing the preparation and interpretation of the Genocide Convention approved by the
General Assembly on Dec. 9, 1948).
13. See Proxmire Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-606, § 2(a), 102 Stat. 3045, 3046 (1988)
(allowing the prosecution of any perpetrator of genocide found in the U.S.).
14. LeBlanc. supra note 12. at 374 (examining the view, held both by the ABA and members
of Congress, that the ordinary meaning of the Genocide Convention's definition of genocide is
intent to destroy a group in whole or in part).
15. Id. at 375.
16. Id. at 373; see also ROBINSON. supra note 12, at 14-19 (discussing issues other U.N.
members had with the definition of genocide).
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to calamities 1 7 such as the Holocaust and Armenian genocide. A full
review of the historical record reveals their grounding in a pernicious
desire to avoid blame for proto-genocidal campaigns conducted on U.S.
soil, particularly lynchings and race riots.18 The near paranoia over
U.S. culpability for genocide expanded during the Vietnam War era,
when opponents of the Genocide Convention1 9 posited that doctrinal
limitations would hinder determinations of intent to exterminate.
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, prominent U.S. legislators and
legal experts contended that courts could not determine genocidal
intent. 20 They argued that even with robust evidence of sustained
violence against a particular group, the intention to exterminate them on
the basis of their affiliation would be hard to prove. 2 1 Groups routinely
engage in bloody conflict over shared resources, cultural differences,
and competing geopolitical aims-and they aim to hurt each other
grievously-but often fall short of undertaking annihilation. Further,
individuals and groups frequently utter discriminatory words without
wishing for the complete destruction of the groups they disparage. U.S.
opponents of the Genocide Convention contended that determining a
purely exterminationist intent was simply beyond the capability of
existing legal systems. 22
Critics of the Genocide Convention claimed that neither domestic nor
international courts could satisfactorily interpret or enforce it. 2 3
Domestic case law provided scant guidance on how to evaluate a

17. The Hebrew word "Shoah," or calamity, is often used to signify the calamity that befell
humanity during the Holocaust. Gavriel D. Rosenfeld. The Politics of Uniqueness:Reflections on
the Recent Polemical Turn in Holocaust and Genocide Scholarship, 13 HOLOCAUST &
GENOCIDE STUD. 28,48 (1999).
18. See LeBlanc. supra note 12. at 374 (arguing that the ABA's objections to the Genocide
Convention's definition of genocide were as much political as legal, since the definition would
make the Convention applicable to lynching and race riots in the U.S.).
19. Opponents of the Genocide Convention included prominent Republican senators such as
Senators Bricker (R-OH). Helms (R-NC). and Thurmond (R-SC), and political advocacy
organizations as diverse as the ABA and ultra-conservative Liberty Lobby. See Zachary Pall, The
Genocide Accountahility Act and U.S. Law: The Evolution and Lessons of Universal Jurisdiction
for Genocide. 3 INTERDISC. J. HUM. RTS. 13, 22 (2008) (explaining that Senators Bricker, Helms,
and Thurmond opposed the Genocide Convention because they saw it as a threat to U.S.
sovereignty).
20. LeBlanc. supra note 12, at 378-79 (noting that both U.S. legislators and ABA
representatives asserted that the International Court of Justice's understanding of the definition of
genocide was a contradiction that could not be applied in practice).
21. Genocidal rhetoric advocating the extermination of the Tutsis fueled the Burundian and
Rwandan genocides, as will be discussed later. The mid-1990s Central African example
demonstrates the possibility of determining genocidal intention from hate speech.
22. Riesenfeld & Abbott, supra note 12. at 623 (explaining the reasons for the United States's
delayed ratification of the Genocide Convention).
23. Id.
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succession of criminal activities leading to the elimination of a people. 24
And international courts seemed willing to adjudge unpopular military
actions genocidal, as they had with the U.S. campaign in Vietnam. 2 5 In
the mid-1960s, the International War Crimes Tribunal ("IWCT") found
the U.S. guilty of committing genocide in Vietnam. 26 At the time-and
until very recently-incitement of genocide within a military campaign
was a foreign concept to U.S. jurists and lawmakers. 2 7 Thus, the
findings of the IWCT only fueled skepticism about the possibility of a
legally sound genocide prevention and punishment doctrine. The IWCT
ruling also bolstered U.S. critics' jurisdictional objections to the
Genocide Convention.
As a general rule, the U.S. objects to oversight by foreign courts. 2 8
Not surprisingly, the Genocide Convention raised red flags about the
power of international courts to try U.S. citizens for crimes committed
domestically or abroad. Some feared that such trials might deprive
these defendants of their constitutional rights. 29 Others saw the
Genocide Convention as a threat to the balance of federalism. 3 0 Still
more critics worried that the U.S. would be unfairly held to a higher
standard than other countries under the Genocide Convention.3 1 They
reasoned that any case brought against the U.S. would have to be
trumped up "because United States citizens are protected by the U.S.
Constitution and . . . the crime of genocide would be unthinkable in the

United States." 32 Such objections delayed the ratification of the
convention for decades and, in the end, yielded a spate of caveats to
U.S. participation. 3 3

24. Id.
25. LeBlanc. supra note 12, at 381 (discussing the charges against the United States for
waging a genocidal war in Vietnam).
26. The IWCT is also known as the Russell Tribunal. Jean-Paul Sartre served as the selfappointed public commentator for the trial, finding genocidal intent "on the battlefield in the
racism of the American soldiers." LeBlanc, supra note 12. at 381: see also Hugo Adam Bedau,
Genocide in Vietnam, 53 B.U. L. REv. 574, 574 (1973) (stating that the TWCT unanimously
found the U.S. government guilty of genocide against the people of Vietnam).
27. See infra note 62 for a discussion of a model "incitement to war crimes" statute that legal
scholar Gregory Gordon is developing.
28. Kenneth Roth, The Charade of US Ratification of International Human Rights Treaties, I
CHI. J. INT'L L. 347. 352 (2000) (discussing U.S. reluctance to join international human rights
protocols because they hinder U.S. business interests and because many in the U.S. feel that the
nation has little to learn about human rights from foreign nations).
29. See Riesenfeld & Abbott. supra note 12. at 577 (explaining that the Senate adopted "treaty
reservations" because of a concern that a treaty may be used to deprive citizens of their
constitutional rights).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 622.
32. Id. at 623.
33. The 1988 ratification was accompanied by two reservations, five understandings, and a
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While the U.S. routinely clarifies its intentions and jurisdiction under
treaties, the 1988 caveats to the Genocide Convention prompted notable
international criticism. 3 4 The world community was taken aback by the
United States's unwillingness to fully submit to the convention and by
the nation's apparent disregard for the proximity of the Holocaust,
seriousness of exterminationism, or worldwide support for the
convention. 35 Some signatories claimed that unless all parties assented
to U.S. reservations and understandings, they would nullify
ratification. 3 6 Others, however, took a more moderate stance. 37 In the
end, the International Court of Justice ("ICJ") sided with moderates and
the modified ratification stuck. 3 8 But the entire episode did little to
dispel U.S. officials' geopolitical concerns.
In the decades leading up to U.S. ratification of the Genocide
Convention and in the years since, many members of the U.S. legal
community have been wary of the politics of international criminal
justice. For instance, early Genocide Convention objectors at the ABA
imagined that the ICJ might target the U.S. for prosecution while
ignoring "groups behind the Iron Curtain." 3 9 LeBlanc contends that,
"[w]hile many of the arguments were couched in legal terms, the
preoccupation of the ABA critics with Soviet policies suggests that their
objections were as much political as they were legal, and perhaps more

declaration. Id.
34. Id. at 587; see also Roth, supra note 28, at 353 (remarking that at U.N. human rights
gatherings, government representatives from other countries criticize the U.S. approach to human
rights).
35. See Riesenfeld & Abbott, supra note 12, at 623 (discussing the effect of the United
States's delay in ratifying the Genocide Convention and the reservations on the "international
cause"). The authors further note that some observers felt that U.S. reservations struck at the
heart of the treaty. Id They explain:
Few reservations could more clearly strike to the object and purpose of a Convention
intended to, inter alia. protect the residents of state parties from crimes committed by
their own government than a reservation which sets up the internal constitutional law
of a state party as a barrier to their protection. If the Genocide Convention had been in
force at the time, the Nazi exterminations in Europe would presumably have escaped
its application had the National Socialist government decided to enact constitutional
changes declaring certain racial, religious, and ethnic classes unprotected as a matter of
constitutional law.
Id. at 624.
36. See id. at 587 (noting that with respect to reservations to the Genocide Convention, some
advocated that in order to be enforceable, all parties to the treaty had to assent to the
reservations).
37. Id.
3 8. Id.
39. LeBlanc. supra note 12. at 374 (recognizing that ABA critics of the Genocide Convention
were concerned that the terms of Article II made the treaty applicable to lynching and race riots in
the U.S. but not to genocide against other "groups behind the Iron Curtain").
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so." 4 0 Since ratification, U.S. jurists have seemingly continued to play
geopolitical games with the ICJ by, for instance, using the Alien Tort
Act to claim jurisdiction over genocide disputes arising entirely in
foreign nations. 4 1
The Alien Tort Act was established via the Judiciary Act of 1789 for
the vague purpose of providing state and circuit courts with jurisdiction
over "causes where an alien sues for a tort ... in violation of the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States." 4 2 For much of U.S. history, the
Alien Tort Act "was essentially a dead letter." 4 3 Its original intent was
to settle disputes between U.S. citizens and foreign nationals during the
nation's early years. 4 4 Once the nation seemed settled, the Alien Tort
Act was largely ignored.4 5
Following World War II and the
international passage of the Genocide Convention, U.S. courts began to
revive the dormant doctrine. 46 As international genocide law was
developing, U.S. jurists were concluding that the Alien Tort Act might
extend to foreign plaintiffs, defendants, and crime scenes.
This
4
7
interpretation had little impact, however, until the I 980s,
when
Congress was preparing to ratify the Genocide Convention.
Though few in number, Alien Tort Act cases have steadily expanded
the reach of U.S. law since the 1980s. In the early 1990s, for instance,
Kadi6 v. Karadii6 broadened the Act to include non-governmental
foreign actors carrying out genocide against foreign nationals on foreign
soil (i.e., in Bosnia).4 8 While none of the judges hearing Alien Tort Act
40. Id.
41. See Peter Schuyler Black, Kadid v. Karadzi6: Misinterpreting the Alien Tort Claims Act,
31 GA. L. REV. 281, 300-02 (1996) (analyzing how a U.S. court found that it had jurisdiction
over a private, nonstate actor).
42. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9(b), I Stat. 73; see also Anne-Marie Burley, The Alien
Tort Statute and The Judiciary Act of 1789: A Badge of Honor. 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 461. 461
(1989) (noting the original statutory definition of the Alien Tort Act).
43. Charles F. Marshall, Re-framing the Alien Tort Act after Kadid v. Karadzii, 21 N.C. J.
INT'L L. & COM. REG. 591, 594 n.40 (1996).
44. See id. (explaining that the Act was intended to cover only the three original violations:
piracy, safe passage, and the slave trade).
45. With the exception of one 1795 case, federal courts "rarely heard and never upheld" Alien
Tort Act Claims until 1960. Id. at 599.
46. See id. at 601 (asserting that U.S. courts "breathed new life" into the Alien Tort Act in
1980 with the Fildrtigav. Pehia-Iraladecision).
47. Notably. in 1980. the Second Circuit broadened the reach of the Alien Tort Act by urging
courts to "interpret international law not as it was in 1789, but as it has evolved and exists among
the nations of the world today." Filhrtiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 881 (2d Cir. 1980),
remanded to 577 F. Supp. 860 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). In 1996. a Second Circuit Chief Judge used this
reasoning to find subject matter jurisdiction in Kadid v. Karadid. 74 F.3d 377. 378 (2d Cir.
1996).
48. The Karad±ii case involves a complicated history. In brief, the case history begins with
twin lawsuits: Doe v. Karad±ii. 866 F.Supp. 734 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) and Kadid v. Karadi, No. 93
Civ. 1163, 1993 WL 385757 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). When the trial courts found no subject matter
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cases have professed a desire to undermine the ICJ, the timing of the
Act's resurgence is curious. In finding subject matter jurisdiction in the
Kadi6 case, jurists implied-willingly or unwillingly-that U.S. courts
were better equipped to handle Bosnian genocide trials than the
Hague. 49 The Kadi6 case suggests that the U.S. plans to maintain its
quasi-isolationist stance toward the regulation and adjudication of hate
speech, incitement, and genocide. 5 0
Though narrow in its scope, the preceding discussion of reservations
and reactions to the Genocide Convention illustrates the sort of
roadblocks facing proponents of hate speech and incitement regulations
today. Just as lawmakers and jurists initially questioned the definition
of genocide, many still doubt the law's ability to distinguish unsavory
but constitutionally protected speech from hate speech or rhetorical
incitement to violence. 5 1 Critics raise important questions, such as who
gets to determine the definition of hate speech, and who will enforce
incitement laws? 52 They also problematize evidentiary standards for
proving exterminationist intent.5 3 They remind us that prejudice is not
jurisdiction, the cases were joined and appealed in Kadid v. Karad i, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995).
The appellate court found subject matter jurisdiction partly because it could discern no more
suitable forum. The Kadid case was subsequently denied certiorari on June 17, 1996, in Karadi6
v. Kadid, 518 U.S. 1005 (1996). Separate courts ultimately awarded $745 million in damages to
the Kadid plaintiffs and $4.5 billion to the Doe plaintiffs. See Rachel Irwin. Civil Actions Offer
Some Closure for Bosnian Victims. INST. FOR WAR & PEACE REPORTING (Apr. 26. 2011).
http://www.iwpr.net/report-news/civil-actions-offer-some-closure-bosnia-victims
(noting the
compensatory and punitive damages in both cases). This discussion is not meant to suggest that
Karadi should not have been convicted (i.e.. ample evidence of his guilt exists). Rather, this
brief analysis of the Alien Tort Act and the Doe and Kadie cases highlights the politics of
jurisdiction selection and the willingness of U.S. courts to tread on the territory of the IC. See
also Black. supra note 41, at 299-306 (discussing how the Second Circuit sought to use the
Karadzidcase to expand the reach of the Alien Tort Act).
49. See Black. supra note 41, at 316-18 (criticizing the Second Circuit in the Karad±ii case
for not instructing the lower court to consider resolution of the dispute in an alternative forum).
50. Alternatively, advocates for the Kadid case, such as Catharine A. MacKinnon, might argue
that it reflects a renewed commitment to Lemkin's ideals within the U.S. legal community.
While such motivations are honorable and in line with this Article, the Kadid rulings also provide
fodder for isolationist lawmakers and jurists.
51. For communication studies professor Franklyn Haiman's discussion of First Amendment
issues surrounding hate speech and religious expression, see FRANKLYN SAUL HAiAMAN, "SPEECH
ACTS" AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1993); FRANKLYN SAUL HAIMAN, RELIGIOUS EXPRESSION
AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (2003).

52. See Mary Anne Franks. The Banality of Cyber Discrimination,or, The EternalRecurrence
of September. I DENV. L. REV. ONLINE 5 (2010) [hereinafter Franks. Banality], available at
http://www.denverlawreview.org/storage/FranksPDF.pdf (discussing the problems with defining
hate speech and enforcing laws against hate speech in the cybercrime context); Mary Anne
Franks, Unwilling Avatars: Idealism and Discriminationin Cyberspace. 20 COLUM. J. GENDER &
L. 124 (2010) [hereinafter Franks, Unwilling Avatars], available at http://ssrn.com/abstract
=1374533 (arguing that cyberspace allows users to create online representatives of others without
their consent and that this practice has powerful discriminatory effects, particularly on women).
53. See LeBlanc, supra note 12, at 370 (discussing Bunyan Bryant's observation that intent of
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against the law-killing is. 54 But the exact moment when homicidal
intent emerges from the ashes of hatred is often unclear and tough to
prove at trial. Selecting the appropriate venue for a hate speech trial is
also difficult, critics suggest, because hate speech and incitement
routinely spill over state boundaries. 55 Determining what constitutes
incitement within diverse localities requires a complex understanding of
the socio-cultural realities of those places, which might not be the
strong suit of U.S. or international legal systems. Such objections arise
from a genuine belief in the power of the U.S. "marketplace of ideas" to
prevent atrocities,56 as well as a reluctance to admit the changing nature

genocide is near impossible to prove absent express intent).
54. Political scientist Peter Uvin suggests that the line between prejudice and genocidal
ideation (or action) is blurred when prejudice becomes institutionalized at the nation-state level.
Still, he and other scholars of genocidal conflict suggest that demarcations between individualized
and state-sponsored prejudice exist in all modem genocides, and they afford opportunities for
international intervention to prevent genocide. See Peter Uvin, Prejudice, Crisis, and Genocide
in Rwanda, 40 AFR. STUD. REv. 91, 101-02 (1997) (providing radical Hutu leaders' anti-Tutsi
campaigns as an example of institutionalized discrimination).
55. See Kathleen Mahoney. Hate Speech, Equality, and the State of CanadianLaw. 44 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 321, 321 (2009) (discussing the globalization of hatred and the resulting
challenges to addressing hate speech internationally).
56. The marketplace analogy was first used by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in 1919 and
has subsequently been invoked by nearly half of the sitting Justices. See W. Wat Hopkins, The
Supreme Court Defines the Marketplace of Ideas, 73 J. & MASS COMM. Q. 40, 41 (1996)
(explaining Justice Holmes's use of the marketplace metaphor. as he argued, "society's ultimate
good 'is better reached by free trade in ideas'). Subsequently. from 1919 to 1995. twenty-four
Justices "used the metaphor at least once." Id. The Court has struggled with the concept,
especially in cases involving sexual expression. See generally Amy Adler. Girls! Girls! Girls!:
The Supreme Court Confronts the G-String, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1108 (2005) (discussing the
concept in the context of the "nude dancing" cases).
Scholars have suggested that the
marketplace is most viable in institutions such as schools and universities. See Joseph Blocher.
Institutions in the Marketplace of Ideas. 57 DuKE L.J. 821, 871 n.207 (2008) (asserting that
scholars have recognized schools as "a public forum where the adult 'marketplace of ideas'
concept holds full sway"). Scholars have also expressed concerns over taken-for-granted
assumptions about the rationality and meritocracy of the marketplace. especially its ability to
protect minority communities and viewpoints (i.e., in line with the Fourteenth Amendment). See
Karen Eltis, A ConstitutionalRight to Deny and Promote Genocide - Preempting the Usurpation
of Human Rights Discourse Towards Incitement from a Canadian Perspective, 9 CARDOZO J.
CONFLICT RESOL., 463, 466 (2008) ("Constitutionalism-the anticipated safeguard against
devastation of democracy from within-may itself, it seems, be co-opted for [the] very purpose"
of "justify[ing] the 'freedom' to deny and promote genocide."): Franks. Unwilling Avatars. supra
note 52, at 23 (arguing that current conceptions of the marketplace of ideas mischaracterize the
status quo. leading to the improper belief that cyberspace is a "paradise" where all people can
express themselves freely): Mahoney. supra note 55, at 349 (explaining that in Keegstra, it was
"recognized that not only can expression be used to the detriment of our search for the truth, it
can also undermine the rationality in an unregulated marketplace of ideas and promote forms of
intolerance and prejudice. Such uses destroy the marketplace of ideas. . . . The marketplace of
ideas is a limited response to the search for truth."); see also Raymie McKerrow, Limitations of
the Public Sphere: The Repressive Voice of Modernity. in EXPERIENCES BETWEEN PHILOSOPHY
AND COMMUNICATION: ENGAGING THE PHILOSOPHICAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF CALVIN 0. SCHRAG
73-88 (2003) (Ramsey E. Ramsey & David J. Miller eds., 2003) ("[C]ontinuing to valorize the
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of message transmission and collective organization. 57
These
arguments lose their logical and juridical force as new media
technologies transport hate speech to social locations well outside the
U.S. marketplace of ideas.
New media technologies facilitate the rapid diffusion of hate speech
to distant locales. 5 8 As a result, time worn strategies of localized hate
mobilization-such as labeling intended victims as the perpetrators of
community violence 59-are now globalized and decontextualized. The
lack of argumentative or empirical context for evaluating hateful claims

public sphere as the site of rational decision making will perpetuate the repression of
marginalized voices."); ALEXANDER TSESIS, DESTRUCTIVE MESSAGES: How HATE SPEECH
PAVES THE WAY FOR HARMFUL SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 199 (2002) (acknowledging that the
"Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the need to protect persons with immutable
characteristics, such as race, color, and ethnicity" and that it is "critical to (statutes) that (are)
tailored narrowly enough to protect First Amendment rights" because hate speech "has played a
significant role in fostering organized and systematic persecutions"); Alexander Tsesis. Dignity
and Speech: The Regulation of Hate Speech in a Democracy, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 497, 512
(2009) (discussing how speech in and of itself is a neutral medium that can validate facism and
justify genocide as easily as it can promote democracy and civil rights).
57. See Eltis, supra note 56, at 471 (discussing that the Supreme Court of Canada, unlike the
United States Supreme Court, "has elected to balance the value of free speech with the
completing constitutional values of dignity. equality and multiculturalism"); Mahoney. supra note
55, at 330 (discussing how disseminators of hate speech have been able to silence their targets,
"effectively knocking them out of the competition in the marketplace of ideas").
58. See Eltis. supra note 56. at 471 (providing examples of the dissemination of hate speech
through new technology, such as anti-Semitic statements made on live television); Mahoney,
supra note 55, at 321 22 (explaining that hate speech can be proliferated on a global level
because of the Internet). See generally Joel R. Reidenberg. Technology and InternetJurisdiction,
153 U. PA. L. REV. 1951 (2005) [hereinafter Reidenberg, Technology] (discussing jurisdictional
issues that arise due to the Internet's lack of territorial boundaries); Joel R. Reidenberg, The
Simplification of International Data Privacy Rules, 29 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1128 (2006)
[hereinafter Reidenberg, Simplification] (proposing simplification of international data privacy
rules as a solution to the obstacles data controllers face in attempting to comply with varyingand conflicting-standards and procedures).
59. Legal scholar Kenneth Marcus has written extensively about this process. describing it as
"inversion." See KENNETH L. MARCUS, JEWISH IDENTITY AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN AMERICA 63
(2010) [hereinafter MARCUS, JEWISH IDENTITY]. According to Marcus, the instigators of hate
speech lob accusations at intended targets of violence, priming bystanders to view the attacked as
the wrongdoers. As a result, conceptions of blame and fault are inverted, and reprisals against the
wrongly accused seem justified. This sort of human rights inversion is evident in metaphors of
the Indian giver and Jewish Nazi. as well as in Jim Crow era narratives of black men as sexual
predators. Such narratives indict victims of the crimes done to them and their communities (e.g.,
broken promises to Native Americans) and "shock, silence, threaten, insulate [the accusers]. and
legitimize" seemingly retributional justice. according to Marcus. Id. For instance. "[t]he myth of
the black rapist served, in the minds of Southern racists, to legitimize Jim Crow lynchings." Id. at
64. And today, critiques of Israel's policies are used to excuse broad-sweeping indictments of all
Jews as uniquely "threatening. immoral, and categorically different from other people." Kenneth
L. Marcus, Jurisprudenceof the New Anti-Semitism, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 371, 376 (2009)
[hereinafter Marcus. Jurisprudence];see also Catharine A. MacKinnon, Prosecutor v. Nahimana,
Barayagwiza. & Ngeze, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 325, 330 (2004) (providing a description of
"accusation in the mirror," another way of framing anti-victim rhetoric).

2012]

Preventing Exterminationism

327

is magnified when message receivers lack certain psychosocial
capacities, such as the ability to analyze complex problems and break
down group stereotypes. 60 Individuals can now target victims from
afar, presenting a unique threat to democracy that did not exist in the
pre-Internet age. According to legal scholar Kathleen Mahoney:
Democracies like Canada and the United States are being challenged
by the culture of hate much differently and more seriously today than
in the past. Today, racism, religious hatred, homophobia, sexism, and
ethnic hatred are globalized, fed by all forms of hate propaganda. The
globalization of hatred includes the additional feature of terrorist
activity . . . . Easily accessed sources of communication now can

broadcast virulent, and even lethal, hate speech promoting
discrimination against, denial of, or assault upon members of certain
groups regardless of where they live. 6 1
U.S. courts are equipped to deal with such threats to democracy. 62
However, U.S. jurists are reluctant to intervene in the infringement of
60. See Steven K. Baum, A Bell Curve of Hate?, 6 J. GENOCIDE RES. 567, 569 (2004)
[hereinafter Baum, Bell Curve] (explaining the three stages of personality development and how
tiers I and II are most vulnerable to "prevailing cultural norms viz. normative hate/stereotypes");
STEVEN K. BAUM, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF GENOCIDE: PERPETRATORS, BYSTANDERS, AND
RESCUERS 105-09 (2008) [hereinafter BAUM. PSYCHOLOGY] (describing perpetrators of
genocide as the least emotionally developed individuals in society and bystanders as more
developed but still underdeveloped compared to those individuals who resist genocide). Hate
speech must be regulated. according to Baum. because it primes certain listeners to accept
exterminationist directives in the future. Id. at 229. Priming activates the mental state necessary
for dehumanization and intergroup violence long before brutality occurs. For those of diminished
capacity and developmental delays. the repetition of hate messages reinforces prejudiced beliefs
(i.e., rather than provoking skepticism of the speaker). See id at 235-36 (arguing that
emotionally underdeveloped individuals are prone to hate out of ignorance and prejudice); see
also Irwin N. Sandler & Brian Lakey. Locus of Control as a Stress Moderator: The Role of
Control Perceptions and Social Support, 10 AM. J. COMMUNITY PSYCHOL. 65, 65 (1982)
(discussing a study that "investigated the effects of locus of control beliefs as an individual
difference variable on (a) the relationship between negative life events and psychological
disorder, (b) perceptions of control over negative life events, and (c) the receipt and impact of
social support"); SHANTO TYENGAR & DONALD R. KINDER, NEWS THAT MATTERS: TELEVISION
AND AMERICAN OPINION (1987) (providing a foundational explanation of priming).
See
generally Mark Cleveland et al., Shades of Green: Linking Environmental Locus of Control and
Pro-Environmental Behaviors, 22 J. CONSUMER MARKETING 198 (2005) (discussing research
that examined "the impact of various attitudes and personality characteristics on environmentallyfriendly behaviors, from a locus of control (LOC) perspective").
61. Mahoney, supra note 55, at 321.
62. See Reidenberg, Technology. supra note 58. at 1954 (explaining that the U.S. Supreme
Court has grappled with how to "apply traditional jurisdiction principles to Internet activities").
Legal scholar Gregory Gordon advises that the U.S. should also be prepared to charge its military
commanders with "incitement to war crimes" if they directly instruct their subordinates to engage
in targeted violence (e.g., against a particular ethnic group). Drawing upon his work as a
prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda, Gordon suggests that this new
incitement statute could evolve from existing military protocols and international law (e.g., Army
Field Manual 27-10, art. 500. and art. 25 of the Rome Convention). See Gregory S. Gordon, "A
War of Media, Words, Newspapers, and Radio Stations": The ICTR Media Trial Verdict and a
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human dignity, 6 3 even though they frequently enjoin speech that
violates commercial interests. 6 4 Legal scholar Joel Reidenberg reasons
that hesitant jurists might fulfill their public duty by at least requiring
those who profit from technology to develop dissemination
safeguards. 65
Despite the existence of such creative juridical
solutions-and mounting social scientific evidence that genocide is a
systematic phenomenon that begins with hate speech 66-U.S. courts
seem largely unwilling to regulate cyber targeting. 6 7 Going forward,
hate speech regulation will necessitate a cultural revolution of sorts, 6 8
one that moves us beyond historical stalemates over the Genocide
Convention. In the meantime, the U.S. has a moral and geopolitical
obligation to actively prevent genocide.
Few cultural, social, or political calamities pose as much threat to
communities, societies, or the human race as genocide. When genocide
is fully implemented, it eliminates one of the world's peoples. No other
New Chapter in the InternationalLaw of Hate Speech, 45 VA. J. INTL L. 139, 189 (2004)
[hereinafter Gordon, War of Media] (discussing the expansion of individual responsibility
vertically); Gregory S. Gordon, Music and Genocide: Harmonizing Coherence, Freedom and
Nonviolence in Incitement Law, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 607, 607 (2010) [hereinafter Gordon,
Music] ("[The] first principles of justice that ultimately define a system of law [are] the principles
of uniform application of rules, of consistency, of evenhandedness, of fairness.") (alteration in
original).
63. Gordon, Music, supra note 62, at 147. For an example of international regulation of
mediatized hate speech, see Yaman Akdeniz, Case Analysis of League Against Racism and
Antisemitism (LICRA), French Union of Jewish Students v. Yahoo! Inc. (U.S.A.), Yahoo France,
Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris (The County Court of Paris), Interim Court Order, Nov.
20, 2000, I ELEC. Bus. REP. 110, 111-12 (2001). Reidenberg points to international cases such
as Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. iCraveTV,No. CIV. A. 00-121, 2000 WL 255989, at *34 (W.D. Pa. 2000) (explaining that the U.S. Supreme Court asserts subject-matter jurisdiction
over a case where a U.S. media company filed suit to enjoin a Canadian startup website from
streaming its programs on the basis that a U.S. citizens had access to the site).
64. Reidenberg, Simplification. supra note 58, at 1954-55.
65. Reidenberg, Technology, supra note 58. at 1971: see also Irene Nemes, Regulating Hate
Speech in Cyberspace: Issues of Desirabilityand Efficacy, I INFO. & COMM. TECH. L. 193, 199
(2002) (stating that regulation of the dissemination of hate speech is "possible via both hardware
and software").
66. See Baum, Bell Curve, supra note 60, at 567 (discussing the attempt of researchers to
understand the psychological aspects of genocidal behavior and the idea of "accidental
genocidalitsts" or "ordinary people [who] become perpetrators given the proper social conditions
and context"); Gregory H. Stanton, The 8 Stages of Genocide, GENOCIDE WATCH (1998),
http://www.genocidewatch.org/aboutgenocide/8stagesofgenocide.html (articulating the first of the
eight stages as classification the process via which individuals within a society categorize groups
and distinguish between "us and them"); Gregory H. Stanton, President, Genocide Watch, Could
the Rwandan Genocide Have Been Prevented?, Address at the Generations of Genocide
Conference (Jan. 27, 2002). in 6 J. GENOCIDE RESEARCH 211-28 (2004) (providing Leon
Mugesera's speech as an example of hate speech occurring early in the genocide process, in
which Mugesera spoke of the Hamitic hypothesis, which portrayed "Tutsis as foreign invaders").
67. Franks, Banality. supra note 52. at 7-8; Franks. Unwilling Avatars. supra note 52. at 20910.
68. Franks, Banality, supra note 52, at 7-8.
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crime carries with it such a steep price. Few natural or human-made
adversities occasion such irreplaceable loss. For this reason, the U.S.
must act to prevent genocide. The nation cannot wait for doctrine to
develop or culture to shift. Given the existing structures and political
will, legislators and jurists must do as much as they can now.6 9
Luckily, cultural support exists for a project that would prevent
genocide and punish its perpetrators: the regulation of systems of
oppression.
Dismantling oppression is a national pastime, or at the very least, a
compelling cultural meme. 70 The U.S. often positions itself as an
exporter of democracy, and much of the citizenry supports this
contention. 71 Though the nation often falls short of its democratic
ideals, 72 many activists and academics maintain hope that the U.S. can
serve as an incubator for new social justice movements. As political
scientist Iris Marion Young advocated, "We . . . can . . . illuminate
oppression, expose ideology, and justify norms and institutions of
justice." 73 The corollary of this cultural conviction is the curtailing of
centralized systems of citizen control. As this Article later outlines,
such a project could be undertaken both domestically and
internationally, increasing its reach and credibility. The Rwandan
genocide and its aftermath afford ample guidance for what needs to be
done in the U.S. and abroad.
69. Given the recent "Arab spring" and nation-state upheavals occurring across the globe, it
seems likely that there is an increased risk of retributive and genocidal violence now. As the U.S.
considers how to contribute positively to people's movements, leaders should consider how they
might use this opportunity to promote increased personal privacy, smaller states, and enhanced
protections of personal freedoms and dignities.
70. See MORTON HALPERIN, JOE SIEGLE & MICHAEL WEINSTEIN, THE DEMOCRACY
ADVANTAGE: How DEMOCRACIES PROMOTE PROSPERITY AND PEACE xv (Routledge ed. 2005)

("[D]emocracies have compelling advantages over their authoritarian counterparts in fostering
social and economic development.").
71. Id.; see also Raymie E. McKerrow, Principles of Rhetorical Democracy, Address at the
Southern States Communication Association National Conference (Apr. 2006) ("[T]he prime task
of democratic politics is not to eliminate passions from the sphere of the public, in order to render
a rational consensus possible, but to mobilize those passions towards democratic designs.").
72. See Gordon Mitchell, Team B Intelligence Coups., 92 Q. J. SPEECH 144, 163-64 (2006)
(discussing how White House officers charged with presenting both sides of a debate for invasion
of Iraq in 2003 purposefully omitted and misrepresented data to suggest few "cons" to U.S.
military intervention, subverting internal intelligence community protocols and broader
conceptions of democratic policy debate).
73. Iris Marion Young, Fighting Words: Black Women and the Search for Justice, 16
HYPATIA 91, 93 (2001) (reviewing PATRICIA HILL COLLINS, BLACK FEMINIST THOUGHT (1990));
see also IRIS MARION YOUNG, INCLUSION AND DEMOCRACY 155 (2000) ("Civil society

promotes trust, choice, and the virtues of democracy."); IRIS MARION YOUNG. JUSTICE AND THE
POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 9 (1990) ("Oppression and domination . . . should be the primary terms

for conceptualizing injustice."); McKerrow, supra note 71. at 165 (arguing that the U.S. must
regain credibility post-Iraq and can do so by changing the ways in which it approaches foreignpolicy debates).
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In Rwanda, age-old citizen control systems were harnessed for the
destruction of most of the Tutsi people in the spring of 1994.74 Today,
many of these control systems are still in use by the Tutsi government
and could be resuscitated as instruments of retaliation or
extermination. 75 Four years of research revealed that local, provincial,
and national government officials actively engage in classification,
surveillance, and micromanagement of the Rwandan people. The
findings are telling, and the lessons extend far beyond Central Africa.
In part, this research suggests constructive avenues for U.S. action.
Both with our Rwandan ally and domestically, the U.S. government
could test and implement systems aimed at protecting human dignity by
constraining the power of government officials and agencies. If
successful, the initiative could usher in a new era of U.S. leadership in
genocide prevention.
The project could commence immediately,
drawing upon the lessons learned from one of the world's greatest
tragedies.

III.

FROM THE FIRST EXPLOSION TO CURRENT EXPLOITATIONS: WHAT
THE U.S. CAN LEARN ABOUT REGULATING SYSTEMS OF OPPRESSION
FROM MODERN RWANDA

A. An Explosion of Violence in 1994
On April 6, 1994, an explosion reverberated throughout Kigali,
Rwanda. Uncertainty spread throughout the capital, and residents
warily went about their evening work. Within hours, they learned that
President Habyarimana's plane had been shot down. 7 6 Roadblocks
emerged throughout the capital and, then, the countryside. 7 7 And then
the killings began. Over days, then weeks, then months-roughly three
months in total-nearly every tenth person in Rwanda was
slaughtered. 78 As many as 1,000,000 people were killed in 100 days, 7 9
74. ALISON LIEBHAFSKY DES FORGES. LEAVE NONE TO TELL THE STORY: GENOCIDE IN
RWANDA 9 (1999).
75. MAHMOOD MAMDANI, WHEN VICTIMS BECOME KILLERS: COLONIALISM, NATIVISM,

AND THE GENOCIDE IN RWANDA 7-8 (2001) (contemplating that we may not be able to
understand genocidal rationale, but we "must understand it as thinkable" because failure to
acknowledge its complex warning signs presently and throughout history inhibits our ability
to recognize when groups are vulnerable to violence).
76. Madeline H. Morris. The Trials of CurrentJurisdiction: The Case of Rwanda, 7 DuKE J.
COMP. & INT'L L. 349, 350-51 (1997) (recognizing that the plane crash triggered the "mass
killings (that) were preplanned and orchestrated by high officials"); see also MAMDANI, supra
note 75, at 4 (noting that the genocide commenced swiftly following the president's
assassination).
77. Jolyon Mitchell, Remembering the Rwandan Genocide: Reconsidering the Role of Local
and Global Media. 6 GLOBAL MEDIA J. 1, 8 (2007) (indicating that those who helped with the
roadblocks "were promised rewards" for their efforts).
78.

PHILIP GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU THAT TOMORROW WE WILL BE KILLED
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or 10,000 per day. It was the swiftest mass murder ever executed and
resulted in the near-extermination of the Rwandan Tutsis.s0 Meanwhile,
another 2,000,000 Rwandans were displaced into neighboring
countries.8 1 Central Africa is still feeling the effects of the Rwandan
genocide and related migrations and regional hostilities. 82
Whenever the killing waned throughout the spring of 1994,
announcers at Radio-T616vision Libre des Milles Collines ("RTLM") 8 3
were ready to fuel the fire. "The graves are only half empty; who will

WITH OUR FAMILIES: STORIES FROM RWANDA 3 (1998).

79. See Erin Daly, Between Punitive and Reconstructive Justice: The Gacaca Courts in
Rwanda, 34 N.Y.U. J. INTL L. & POL. 355, 361 (2002) (noting that the massacre took place
between April 7, 2004. and July 17. 2004). Estimates for the number killed during the genocide
vary. Anthropologist Mahmood Mamdani contends that "between ten and fifty thousand Hutu,
and between 500,000 and a million Tutsi" died during the 100-day genocide." See MAMDANI,
supra note 75. at 5 (providing an estimate and stating that "[n]o one can say with certainty how
many Tutsi were killed . . ."). Mamdani notes that these statistics are drawn from problematic
sources and mathematical extrapolations of 1991 census data. Christian Davenport and Allan C.
Stain contend that that same census data, which recorded 600,000 Tutsi in 1991, paired with data
from the Ibuka genocide survivors organization. noting that 300.000 Tutsis survived the
genocide, suggests that of the "800,000 to I million believed to have been killed ... more than
half were Hutu." Scholars are still attempting to validate Davenport and Stam's claims.
especially given that the 1991 census data underreported the number of Tutsis living in Rwanda
then. See Christian Davenport & Allan C. Stain, What Really Happened in Rwanda?, MILLERMCCUNE (Oct. 6, 2009). http://www.miller-mccune.com/... /what-really-happened-in-rwanda3432/ (concluding that their "best estimate of who died during the 1994 massacre" was between
300,000 and 500,000 Tutsi victims). According to Davenport & Stam, "If we believe the
estimate of close to 1 million total civilian deaths the war and genocide. we are then left with
between 500.000 and 700.000 Hutu deaths." Id. The killings were not evenly spread out across
Rwanda's provinces. See Philip Verwimp, Death and Survival During the 1994 Genocide in
Rwanda, 58 POPULATION STUD. 233, 236-37 (2004) (providing statistical evidence on the death
and survival rates in different communes of the Kibuye prefecture in Rwanda; a sample
demographic showing variation even within one geographical area).
80. See Minh Day, Alternative Dispute Resolution and Customary Law: Resolving Property
Disputes in Post-Conflict Nations, A Case Study of Rwanda. 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 235. 239
(2001) ("In the span of a little more than one hundred days in the spring of 1994, Rwanda
suffered the swiftest genocide the world has ever witnessed.").
81. Christine L. Kellow & H. Leslie Steeves, The Role ofRadio in the Rwandan Genocide. 48
J. COMM. 107, 107 (1998).
82. See Idean Salehyan, The Externalities of Civil Strife: Refugees as a Source of
International Conflict, 52 AMER. J. POL. SCI. 787, 793 (2008) (articulating that beyond the
immediate human toll, the Rwandan Genocide "contributed to long-term instability across the
Great Lakes region of Africa").
83. Radio-T616vision Libre des Milles Collines was one of Rwanda's largest radio stations.
The station name, The Land of 1000 Hills, references the popular name for Rwanda. See
Mitchell, supra note 77, at I (investigating ways that "audiences both inside and outside Rwanda
were told about what was happening" during the one hundred days of mass murder in the spring
of 1994, focusing specifically on the Rwandan radio station RTLM); Schabas, supra note 6, at 3
("Article III [of the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide]
lists four additional categories of the crime of genocide . . . . The most controversial, 'direct and
public incitement', is restricted by two adjectives so as to limit conflicts with the protection of
freedom of expression.").
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help us fill them?" they provoked. 84 They reminded members of the
interahamwe, the Hutu extremist youth militias, that the Tutsi inyenzi or
"cockroaches" needed to be exterminated. 5 RTLM announcers even
invented lies to frighten those Hutus reluctant to kill. 86 For example,
RTLM broadcasters encouraged listeners to ponder, "Why weren't there
any Hutu bodies in the streets?" 87 In response, the broadcasters
suggested that Tutsis were burying, hiding, and even eating their Hutu
neighbors.8 8 Shortly after the genocide, one French journalist stated, "If
Rwandan crimes against humanity ever come to trial, the owners of
Radio des Mille Collines will stand at the head of the accused." 89 In the
end, Ferdinand Nahimana and Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, founders and
directors of RTLM, did stand trial. 90 The ICTR Trial Chamber found
ample evidence that the radio defendants had perpetuated genocide.91
Hate speech fueled the genocidal fire in Rwanda. 92 The same was
true in neighboring Burundi.93 There, the message "Inivo nu gutwi," or
"[chop them] at the level of the ear," circulated interpersonally and
societally for years leading up to the mass murder of the country's
84. Darryl Li. Echoes of Violence: Considerations on Radio and Genocide in Rwanda, 6 J.
GENOCIDE RES. 9, 9 (2004).
85. Kellow & Steeves, supra note 81, at 120 (describing the RTLM "broadcast orders to
exterminate all Tutsis").
86. Id. at 121. This tactic exemplifies the "inversion" strategies described by Kenneth
Marcus, in which victims are portrayed as perpetrators of violence. See MARCUS, JEWISH
IDENTITY, supra note 59, at 63 (discussing the "human rights inversion," where victims are
accused of "the very wrong that they have suffered"). For example, "the stereotype of Jewish
conspiratorial power, combined with the use of Nazi motifs . . . . [that ascribes guilt, which]
carries with it the threat of punishment." Id.
87. Kellow & Steeves, supra note 81. at 121 (explaining that the "broadcasters made up
reasons why no Hutu bodies were visible").
88. Id. Kellow and Steeves's research revealed that "[s]ometimes, the broadcasts made up
reasons why no Hutu bodies were visible .... In another gruesome excerpt from June 14, 1994.
the 'inyenzi-inkotanyi' were accused of killing Hutus by dissecting them alive .....
Id.
89. See Francois Misser & Yves Jaumain, Death by Radio, 23 INDEX ON CENSORSHIP 72, 72
(1994) (discussing the RTLM's role in the Hutu government's propaganda).
90. Hassan Ngeze, Editor-in-Chief of Kangura. a pro-genocide newspaper. also stood trial.
See Gordon, Music, supra note 62, at 613 (explaining that the defendants in Prosecutor v.
Nahimana, Barayagwiza & Ngeze, the "Media Case," were Nahimana and Barayagwiza. "the
founders and directors" ofRTLM).
91. Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza & Ngeze, Case No. ICTR 99-52-T, Judgment and
Sentence (Dec. 3, 2003); see also Gordon, Music, supra note 62, at 613 ("The Tribunal assessed,
among other things, whether the RTLM broadcasts and the Kangura writings constituted direct
and public incitement to commit genocide. . . . [T]he Trial Chamber erased any lingering doubts
as to whether the crime of direct and public incitement to commit genocide requires a showing of
violence occasioned by the incitement. It does not.").
92. See Kellow & Steeves, supra note 81, at 109 (specifically noting that in the Rwandan
situation, fear was perpetuated through contagion and the media's ability, often by providing
incomplete information, to inspire imitation of actions).
93.

See TRACY KIDDER. STRENGTH IN WHAT REMAINS 270 (2010) (noting ways in which

anti-Tutsi hate speech and propaganda lead to genocide in Burundi).
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Tutsis. 94 Ethnically targeted rhetoric incited group violence in both
countries.
But rhetoric alone cannot account for the region's
gruesomely efficient genocides or any of the world's modern genocides.
While hate speech can inflame genocidal proclivities and legitimize
group violence, it only leads to mass extermination if a number of
citizen control systems are fully operational.9 5 In Rwanda, a series of
interlocking, racialized, authoritarian structures-developed over
centuries-enabled genocidaires to carry out their work. 96 Had those
citizen control systems not been in place, 1994 might have witnessed
another pogrom of the sort perpetuated against Tutsis and Hutus 9 7
throughout the late twentieth century. But what happened during that
spring was genocide, set in motion during the creation of the modern
Rwandan state.
B. The Formationof the Rwandan State, Identity Categories,and
Systems of Oppression
Rwanda was at peace five hundred years ago. Renowned
anthropologist Mahmood Mamdani has argued that that is partly
94. Id. at 116.
95. See MAMDANI, supra note 75, at 7 ("[T]his was neither just a conspiracy from above that
only needed enough time and suitable circumstance to mature, nor was it a popularjacquiere
gone berserk. If the violence from above could not have spread without cultivation and direction
from above, it is equally true that the conspiracy of the tiny fragment of genocidiares could not
have succeeded had it not found resonance from below."); Philip Verwimp, PeasantIdeology and
Genocide in Rwanda under Habyarimana, in GENOCIDE IN CAMBODIA AND RWANDA: NEW

PERSPECTIVES 1. 2 (Susan E. Cook ed., 2005) (arguing that Habyarimana's speeches were not
"mere rhetoric" but that "Habyarimana actually implemented the policies that he advocated in his
speeches").
96. See MAMDANI, supra note 75, at 7 ("[V]iolence of the genocide was the result of both
planning and participation."); David Newbury & Catharine Newbury, Bringing the PeasantsBack
in: Agrarian Themes in the Construction and Corrosion of Statist Historiography in Rwanda, 105
AM. HIST. REV. 832. 836 (2000) (recognizing that the political system in Rwanda arose as a result
of "politically dominant groups adopting colonial hegemonies and [drawing] on colonial force to
extend their power well beyond the effective administrative reach of the pre-colonial monarchy").
97. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Amnesty International ("Al") documented tens of
thousands of killings of Hutu elites and their children by Burundi's Tutsi government. The
largest killing was in 1972, "when an estimated 100,000 Hutus were killed . . . . with the
participation of government troops . . . ."

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL.

WEEKLY UPDATE

SERVICE 29/88 (Aug. 25. 1988). The report was accessed at the Al archives at Columbia
University. See Amnesty International USA National Office 1966 2000 (1974-1993) HR #0001,
Box 358. Approximately 300,000 Burundian Hutus fled to Rwanda. Tanzania. and Zaire that
year. Id. I also documented the jailing and torture of Burundian teachers who spoke out against
the government policy of denying Hutus education in the 1980s. Id. Though Hutus comprise a
much larger proportion of the population in both Burundi and Rwanda, the Burundian
government targeted Hutus on the basis of their group affiliation and sought to eliminate any
members of the group that might one day rule. I would argue that this sort of killing is genocidal
in nature (i.e., aimed at eliminating a gene pool), though others might disagree (i.e.. because the
entire Hutu population was not targeted). It is important to note that pogroms against Tutsis
occurred throughout the region at the same time.
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because Rwanda had no state. 9 8 Nor did it have fixed identity
categories upon which to base state policies. From the freeform
atmosphere of the fifteenth century9 9 to the rise of the royal court in the
eighteenth century, power remained relatively diffuse, 10 0 which enabled
some Hutu, Tutsi, and Twalol to achieve high status. As Historian
David Newbury has argued, social positions and group identities "were
not randomly changing, to be sure, but neither were they static,
enduring primordial features of Rwandan social structures." 102 For
instance, Hutu meant everything from cultivator, 103 to cattle client,104 to
98. See MAMDANI, supra note 75, at 61-63 (describing the peaceful nature of the region prior
to formation of the Rwandan state).
99. During the Nyaginya dynasty of fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the first central rulers
were sacred leaders not administrators. These "Rwandan king[s] exercis[ed] very little power
over the population and none over the means of production." Villia Jefremovas. Contested
Identities: Power and the Fictions of Ethnicity, Ethnography, and History in Rwanda, 39
ANTHROPOLIGICA 91, 93 (1997).

100. It took several hundred years for Rwanda to become an autocratic, centralized state. The
evolution began when sixteenth century King Kigeri Mukobanya formed a military and instituted
the practice of tribute payments. Id. at 94: David S. Newbury. "Bunyabungo ": The Western
Rwandan Frontier, 1750 1850,

in THE

AFRICAN

FRONTIER:

THE

REPRODUCTION

OF

TRADITIONAL AFRICAN SOCIETIES 170 (Igor Kopytoff ed., Indiana Univ. Press. 1987)
(articulating that during this time, the "Court became the dominant political actor with a
preponderant role in the distribution of political resources among the various factions in the
country"). During Mukobanya's rule, regional administrators "started to take over the functions
of lineage heads." Jefremovas, supra note 99. at 94. In the mid-nineteenth century, King
"Rwabugiri . . . thoroughly consolidated [this] system of clientage. smashed the power of the
lineages . . . and . . . systematic[ally] appropriat[ed] . . . community and fallow lands . ...

Id.

101. The Twa are called "pygmies" by many Rwandans and outsiders. They are typically
short and stocky and comprise roughly one percent of the population. Many Rwandans perceive
the Twa to be among the oldest of Rwanda's peoples, though they have long been relegated to the
margins of society. See Peter Uvin, Ethnicity and Power in Burundi and Rwanda: Different
Paths to Mass Violence, 31 COMP. POL. 253, 255 (1999) (discussing the historical hierarchy of
Rwanda, in which the Twa inhabited the lowest level). While there are few or no phenotypic
distinctions between Hutus and Tutsis, Twa look different to both local and foreign observers.
Some scientific evidence suggests that they are genetically distinct from Tutsis and Hutus. See A.
S. Santachiara-Benerecetti et al., Subtyping of Human Red Cell Phosphoglcomutase Locus I
(PGIfi) Polymorphism: A Third PGIf, Allele Common among Twa Pygmies from North Rwanda,
33 Am. J. HUm. GENETICS 817. 818-19 (1981) (summarizing the results of a study that finds a
genetic allele, PGA1f, that might be unique to Twa Pygmies). Of course, even if Twa are
genetically distinct from Hutus and Tutsis, the more salient factor is how that information is
treated within Rwandan society.
102. David Newbury, The Clans of Rwanda: A Historical Hypothesis, 50 AFRICA 389, 391
(1980).
103. The most frequent and lasting distinction made between Hutus and Tutsi is one of
occupation/social location. Tutsis are associated with the more prestigious occupation of animal
production (i.e., pastoral activities), whereas Hutus are associated with growing crops (i.e.,
agricultural activities). In ancient times. some well-connected Hutus became Tutsi by acquiring
cows.

See DANIELLE DE LAME, A HILL AMONG A THOUSAND: TRANSFORMATIONS AND

RUPTURES INRURAL RWANDA 352 54 (2005) (discussing the importance of cows in Rwandan
culture and socio-political power). It is important to note that within the categories of Hutu and
Tutsi. there has always been great social variance (e.g., rich and poor among both groups).
104. As Catharine Newbury has documented, cattle clientship evolved from a somewhat
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person of medium height, 0 5 to poorer person, to genetically inferior,1 0 6
to marginalized majority,10 7 to original inhabitant,10 8 to victim of the
Tutsi elite, to perpetrator-or even victiml 09-of the region's numerous
twentieth century pogroms. But long before the terms Hutu and Tutsi
became racialized or associated with opposite sides of a genocide, ties
to kin, clan, and region were central to Rwandans' self conceptions and
to the diminutive nation's power structure.
According to historians David and Catharine Newbury, familial and
local ties remained important even as the royal court began to develop
the two-group state system.11 0
Concomitantly, inefficient
communication and transportation infrastructure hindered the efforts of
the earliest royals to exert control over more than a small minority of
the people."' Anthropologist Danielle de Lame has argued that the
rural poor often placed more importance on the fulfillment of social
obligations than ties to the royal court or to Hutu or Tutsi lineages.112
symbiotic or reciprocal relationship to one of Hutu servility throughout the 1800s as the royal
court exerted increasing authority in certain areas of Rwanda and certain social institutions
withered. CATHARINE NEWBURY, THE COHESION OF OPPRESSION: CLIENTSHIP AND ETHNICITY
IN RWANDA. 1860-1960, at 119 (1993).
105. MAMDANI. supra note 75, at 44 (stating that colonial archeologists observed the Hutus
were "squat and of medium height"); see also Newbury & Newbury, supra note 96, at 839
(discussing how stereotypes about the physical differences between Hutus and Tutsis impacted
the social distinction between the groups).
106. Id. During Belgian colonization, Western eugenics scientists claimed that their
measurements of Hutus' skulls, noses, etc., demonstrated genetic weaknesses and attendant
intellectual inferiority relative to the Tutsis. Id.
107. Id. Hutus were the marginalized majority under Belgian occupation, though only a
handful of Tutsis enjoyed great privilege under the colonial administration. Hutus comprise
roughly 85% of the population.
108. Id.
109. Hundreds of thousands of Hutus died during the genocide. See Davenport & Stam, supra
note 79 (stating that some Hutu moderates were killed by Hutu extremists, others were killed by
the invading Tutsi army (i.e., Rwandan Patriotic Army ("RPA")), and still others suffered various
casualties of war and displacement); MAMDANI, supra note 75, at 4 (noting that estimates of the
number of Hutus killed is between five hundred thousand and one million).
110. Newbury & Newbury, supra note 96, at 840. Uvin argues that the primary difference
between the Rwandan and Burundian genocides was that (intranational) regionalism played a

major role in the Rwandan mass killings, whereas social inequality was the main contributor to
violence in Burundi. Uvin, supra note 101, at 253-54. As such. Uvin places more emphasis on
regional divides than most other scholars of the genocide. Id. Regardless of whether regionalism
contributed significantly to the mounting animosity of the early 1990s, ample evidence suggests
that hate speech was targeted primarily at the Tutsis and that it spurred widespread killing. Id. at
260. In essence, it is difficult to prove whether regionalism or racism was a greater causal factor
in Rwandan unrest from 1990-1994. Both antagonisms were exacted on Tutsi scapegoats. Id at
265 ("The rulers in Rwanda have reinforced the 'truth' of their racist ideology by pointing to the
massacres of Hutu (by the Tutsi-dominated army) in Burundi in 1965, 1972, 1988, 1989, and
1993 to 'prove' that all Tutsi seek the ruthless oppression of the Hutu.").
111. Id.at256.
112. DE LAME. supra note 103, at 459 (discussing how ritualized social practices can possibly
be more effective in minimizing inequalities in Rwanda).
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Even in recent times, many peasants still hold those ancestries suspect,
recalling that some forefather or another transitioned from one group to
the other. 113 But such social fluidity was anathema to the emerging
royal court, which embraced the Hutu-Tutsi divide as a ruling
philosophy.
By the early twentieth century, the royal court and German
colonists 114 had come to terms over the ruling of Rwanda. They agreed
that efficient administration required specialization among Rwanda's
different peoples." 5 In a twisted take on the nation's history, royal
leaders convinced colonial administrators that the Tutsi court had long
held great power and should continue to rule.11 6 Royals also argued
that the Tutsi people were the superior tribe or ethnicity.'1 Catholic
missionaries then began to suggest that the two groups might actually be
descendants of different races.118
In the early 1900s, prominent missionaries known as the "white
fathers" 11 9 opined that Tutsis were the long-lost progeny of Ham,
Noah's outcast son. 12 0 In what became known as the Hamitic
113. Id.
114. leuan

Griffiths, The Scramble for Africa: Inherited Political Boundaries, 152

GEOGRAPHICAL J. 204, 204 (1986) (noting that Germany was "awarded" Ruanda-Urundi at the

1884-1885 Berlin Conference).
115. Newbury & Newbury. supra note 96. at 847.
116. See NEWBURY, supra note 104, at 53 (finding that the Rwandan royals preferred the
Tutsi court as opposed to regional and local leaders who actually held most of the power during
the mid-eighteenth century): Newbury & Newbury. supra note 96. at 847 (stating that the
Rwandan central court claimed to colonial authorities that its territorial domain stretched to the
Kagera River over an area known as Gisaka, which, in reality, was recently politically
autonomous).
117. See Newbury & Newbury. supra note 96. at 837-39 (discussing how European observers
celebrated the Tutsis as tall and slender with aquiline noses and fine hair).
118. See MAMDANI, supra note 75, at 87-88 ("For Father Lon Classe, the future bishop of
Rwanda and the key architect of missionary police, the Tutsi were already in 1902 'superb
humans' . . . just as for Father Franqois Menard, writing in 1917, a Tutsi was 'a European under a
black skin."'); CAROL RITTNER, JOHN K. ROTH & WENDY WHITWORTH, GENOCIDE IN RWANDA:
COMPLICITY OF THE CHURCHES? 49 (2004) ("Catholic missionaries . . . considered Rwanda a
country of two completely different human groups

which they later called 'ethnic groups' and

'races'-the Hutus, who made up the peasant masses, and the Tutsis, who were considered to be
aristocrats."); Newbury & Newbury, supra note 96, at 837 (discussing popular lore stating that
ethnicity was supposed to pervade all aspects of Rwandan culture, from personal capacities to
political stratification, which led to the "assumption that, without empirical evidence, the three
principal ethnic groups-Tutsi, Hutu. and Twa-were seen as entirely separate: separate in their
cultures, histories, and racial origins"). Mamdani contends: "The Church was the original
ethnographer of Rwanda. It with the original author of the Hamitic hypothesis ... without the
Church. there would have been no 'racial' census in Rwanda." MAMDANI. supra note 75. at 232.
119. See Newbury & Newbury. supra note 96, at 843-84 (discussing how the missionary
priests of the Missionnaires d'Afrique were commonly referred to as the "White Fathers" "after
the long white cassock that characterizes their dress code, modeled on the Muslim attire of North
Africa where the order was founded").
120. MAMDANI, supra note 75, at 87 ("The Hamites had now become an entire branch of the
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hypothesis, Tutsis were portrayed as white men with black skin, closer
in ancestry and disposition to the European colonists than the middling
Hutus. 12 1 By the time Belgium assumed control of the country,122 the
missionaries' Hamitic hypothesis had taken root. The church-run
school system and court elites reinforced the new, conjured history of
Rwanda's people.12 3 In 1933, Belgium made the lie permanent by
requiring Rwandans to carry racial identity cards. 124 Following the
nation's independence,1 2 5 Hutu governments maintained the identity
card system.12 6 In 1994, the cards made it possible to determine if a
person was Hutu or Tutsi, deserving of safe haven or destined to
perish. 127
Rwanda's state-sanctioned identity card system made sorting possible
during the genocide. But that process alone could not have consumed
the lives of so many. Additional bureaucratic technologies-designed
race of Caucasians; the Tutsis were said to be but one of many Hamite groups . . . . [O]nly in
Rwanda was the notion that the Tutsi were a race apart from the majority turned into a rationale
for a set of institutions that reproduced the Tutsi as a racializedminority.").
121. MAMDANI, supra note 75, at 87.
122. See Timeline: Rwanda, BBC, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/1070329.stm (last updated
Dec. 27, 2011).
123. See the discussion of Rwandan historian Alexis Kagame's revisionist history and other
historiographical issues in Newbury & Newbury, supra note 96, at 843; see also DAVID
NEWBURY, THE LAND BEYOND THE MISTS: ESSAYS ON IDENTITY AND AUTHORITY IN
PRECOLONIAL CONGO AND RWANDA 269 tbl. 11.4 (2009) (analyzing the comparative

chronologies of Rwandan kings, from Ruganzu to Rwabugiri).
124. See Timothy Longman. Identity Cards,Ethnic Self-Perception, and Genocide in Rwanda.
in DOCUMENTING INDIVIDUAL IDENTITY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF STATE PRACTICES IN THE
MODERN WORLD 346 (Jane Caplan & John Torpey eds., 2001) (describing how Belgians
instituted ethnic classifications that many commentators believe were the root causes of the 1994
genocide).
125. Rwanda's independence movement began in 1959, with an uprising of the Hutus against
the royal court. Belgium supported the Hutu uprising and granted the nation its independence in
1962. See Catharine Newbury, Ethnicity and the Politics of History in Rwanda, 45 AFR. TODAY
7, 13 (1998) (outlining Rwanda's political history).
126. Longman, supra note 124, at 354. At the time Habyarimana took power, he promised
racial harmony. Id. However, the president resurrected the Hutu/Tutsi distinction as a means to
rebuild his support network, made claims that he was the Hutu defender, and that his opposition
wanted to restore Tutsi dominance over Hutus. Id.
127. European eugenics scientists claimed to observe phenotypic distinctions between Hutus
and Tutsis during their early-twentieth century research experiments. Those scientists held racist
biases and conducted unreliable experiments. Additionally, the daily observations of millions of
Rwandans demonstrated few or no observable differences between the two groups (i.e.. even
Rwandans could not tell if other Rwandans were Hutu or Tutsi). It is quite probable that a group
of genetically distinct Tutsi herders migrated from the North, possibly Ethiopia, in approximately
the fourteenth century. However, in the intervening centuries, intermarriage was commonplace
and genetic demarcations eroded. See MAMDANI. supra note 75, at 47 ("Tutsi may be ancient
East Africans-'elongated East Africans' whose physical distinctiveness attested to successful
adaptation to and survival in a dry arid climate over millennia."). For a broader discussion of the
nature of eugenics discourses and argumentation, see generally Celeste Condit, Race and
Genetics from a Modal MaterialistPerspective, 94 Q. J. SPEECH 383 (2008).

338

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 43

to keep leaders in power and the citizenry in check-guaranteed that
both victims and killers would submit to instructions, report to killing
sites, and succumb to the master plan.12 8 In Rwanda, seemingly benign,
ancient, and modern public administration apparatuses provided a
means for organizing widespread execution. 12 9 Among the most
important of these was umuganda-compulsory communal labor for the
state.13 0 Throughout the spring of 1994, victims and perpetrators
reported to their typical Saturday umuganda sites as instructed.1 3 1 Most
could not have fathomed that the ancient practice would be used to
carry out the slaughter of the Tutsis.
C. Umuganda: Compulsory Communal Laborfor the State in Times of
Peace, Genocide, and Today
1. The Evolution of the Practice from Pre-Modern Rwanda to 1994
Umuganda derives from a Kinyarwanda word connoting neighborly
collaboration, especially in the building of homes. 132 On the surface, it
signifies the co-creation of something durable. In the earliest times,
umuganda likely referred to the sort of communal homesteading farmers
engaged in around the world. Yet, in modern times, umuganda has
assumed another meaning. Since the sixteenth century, umuganda has
meant the purchase of safety from local land-owners-and later the
centralized state-through weekly or monthly sweat equity. 133
Rwanda's peasants have served as a source of cheap labor for the
nation's elites. As in many feudal societies, peasants initially plowed
128. See Verwimp, supra note 95, at 33 (arguing Habyarimana might have planned to
"cleanse" his home region first, before moving on to the rest of the country).
129. See GOUREVITCH, supra note 78, at 252 ("The list of Rwanda's 'Most Wanted' was a
hodgepodge of akazu members, military officers, journalists. politicians, businessmen, mayors.
civil service functionaries, clerics, schoolteachers, taxi drivers, shopkeepers, and untitled hatchet
men . . . ."); Verwimp, supra note 95, at 31 ("Just as burgomasters had organized barriers and
patrols before the genocide so now they enforced regular and routine participation in such
activities against the Tutsi. They sent councilors and their subordinates from house to house to
sign up all adult males, informing them when they were to work. Or they drew up lists and
posted the schedules at the places where public notices were usually affixed.").
130. Verwimp, supra note 95. at 35 (stating that umuganda is the well-known word for
weekly "communal labor for development" and was also used to describe and organize killings).
131. Verwimp, supra note 79, at 233 (noting that every adult was required to participate in
weekly communal labor known as umuganda).
132. According to Rwandan linguist Eugene Shimamungu, umuganda is a "piece of wood that
is driven into the ground in order to serve as pillars for a house ....
When neighbours were
building. each person would bring a piece of timber to assist in building and in that mutual selfhelp context the term 'umuganda' meant community self-help." Eugene Shimanungu, Testimony
before Prosecutorv. Kanyabashi, ICTR, Case No.: ICTR-98-42-T (Mar. 16, 2005).
133. See Jefremovas, supra note 99. at 94 (indicating that most Hutus who received land from
"men of the land," or chiefs, did so in exchange for labor, known as uburetwa, "in which they
worked two out of every five days for the land chief").
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and harvested for local landowners to earn various considerations. 134
Then, as the royal court centralized power throughout the nineteenth
century, peasant labor contributed to common defense and security.13 5
Compulsory unpaid labor, in the form of umuganda, enabled royal
rulers to orchestrate public works projects and keep track of the
whereabouts of the people. 136 Rwanda's colonizers continued the royal
court's practice.
German occupation of the nation, which lasted nearly two decades,
was a hands-off affair. Royal court oversight of institutions such as
umuganda enabled Germany to maintain a skeleton crew of
administrators in Rwanda. 13 7 When Belgium transformed the public
administration system in the mid-1920s, it layered a newly racialized
Hutu-Tutsi distinction1 3 8 onto existing citizen control systems. As a
result, these systems disproportionately burdened the poorest Hutus and
Twas.139 Many of these early twentieth century public sector reformsincluding umuganda-were maintained long after Rwanda achieved
independence and continue to this day.140
134. Verwimp, supra note 95, at 7 (stating that President Habyarimana regularly used the
notion of work to promote his ideology). When talking about the Tutsi. he would describe them
as feudalists who refused manual work. Id. He also portrayed them simplistically as the former
masters of the Hutu-peasants. Id "[T]hey are always plotting against the Hutu and working for
the benefit of their own ethnic group." Id.
135. King Rwabugiri ensured that "[b]y the beginning of the 20th century. the majority of the
population in the central regions of Rwanda was part of a dependent peasantry." Jefremovas,
supra note 99, at 96. He leveraged patrimonial traditions to justify peasant labor. See David
Norman Smith. The PsychoculturalRoots of Genocide:Legitimacy and Crisis in Rwanda. 53 AM.
PSYCH. 743, 744 (1998) (stating that peasants were relied on to enrich the royal court's granaries
and herds): see also Alison Des Forges, Defeat is the Only Bad News: Rwanda under Musinga,
1896-1931 (1972) (Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University) (on file with author) (detailing how a
small minority of Rwandan elites extended their own power during colonization via the royal
court).
136. Verwimp, supra note 95, at 19 (explaining the importance of umuganda to the Rwandan
economy, as the government claimed that it resulted in a substantial amount of unpaid labor
available to the state and it was used to build schools, roads, sanitation facilities, and health
centers).
137. For example, the Germans stationed five administrators in the nation in 1913 and relied
upon Tutsi elites and Catholic missionaries to maintain order. Newbury & Newbury, supra note
96. at 845.
138. MAMDANI, supra note 75, at 99. The Belgians relied heavily on data provided by the
Church, "whose local servants knew very well their neighbors and their genealogy." Id The
Belgians relied upon three major sources of information when determining how to divide the
society: oral information filtered by the church, physical attributes, and cow herd ownership. Id.
139. The Twas and the Hutus were considered the beasts of burden in the new Belgian
administration. Id.
140. For example. reforms of the imihigo system used to track local performance toward
development targets. See Sarah Ryan et al., Peace-building Through Good Governance and
Capable Statehood, 21 PEACE REv. 286. 291 (2009) (explaining how the age-old imihigo system
has been revived as a means of assessing local communities' accomplishments, which has
enabled central government officials to efficiently monitor the activities and expenditures of local
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In the mid-1970s, Rwandan President Juv6nal Habyarimana reimagined umuganda as a tactic for rooting out "inactivity."'41 In
describing his plans for the communal "democratization" of modern
Rwanda, the president told a newspaper reporter, "First the population
must get down to work-the Government and myself want to
emphasize the value of work on the land. Thus we shall devote each
Saturday to tilling the soil with hoes in our own hands."l 4 2 Of course,
the work performed by the president and his cronies-as documented in
pictures at the National University Rwanda ("NUR")14 3-was often far
less back-breaking than the labor performed by those subsisting on less
than a dollar a day.
President Habyarimana actually noted the peasants' distinguished
umuganda performance.
In fact, he increasingly contrasted Hutu
farmers' physical contributions to the state with Tutsi pastoralists'
supposedly laggard efforts. 144 In the years immediately preceding the
Rwandan genocide, the economy began to falter, and the formerly
integrationist president needed a scapegoat.145 Umuganda provided a
useful metaphor for the growing anti-Tutsi campaign led by his wife
and her family.14 6 The crux of the argument was that the Tutsis would
not contribute to the building of the nation. l4 7 This was not surprising,
given that they were neither farmers nor truly Rwandan. 14 8 The
swirling rhetoric of an alien and parasitic race unwilling to participate in
umuganda fomented genocidal tendencies. But umuganda did more
than provide fodder for hateful narratives; it enabled genocidaires to
carry out their work in the spring of 1994.
President Habyarimana was assassinated on April 6, 1994, but his
citizen control systems survived. 149 His information-administration
officials).
141. MAMDANI, supra note 75, at 146 (describing the origin of umuganda, a "custom" of
once-a-week forced labor that was formally launched by the president in February 1974).
142. Id.
143. The pictures were observed in the NUR historical Rwanda archives during field research
in June July 2009.
144. Verwimp, supra note 95. at 21. In a 1973 speech. Habyaimana stated, purportedly
directed at the Tutsi. "The spirit of intrigue and feudal mentality . . . the valuation of labor . .. the
harmfulness of the one who refuses to work." Id.
145. MAMDANI. supra note 75, at 148 (detailing the decline of the Rwandan economy in the
years preceding the genocide).
146. Id. '"Inactivity' was one of the three social evils the Second Republic pledged to
eradicate at the very outset." Id. at 146.
147. See Philip Verwimp, The PoliticalEconomy of Coffee, Dictatorship,and Genocide. 19
EUR. J. POL. ECON. 161, 179 (2003) (explaining that blaming the Tutsi was instrumental in
masking the regime's responsibility for the economic hardship and political crisis).
148. Id.; see also MAMDANI. supra note 75. at 135 (describing the attitude towards the Tutsi
as "resident aliens").
149. Verwimp, supra note 95, at 27 28 (charting the comparisons between the decisions of
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system was quickly refashioned into "an efficient extermination
machine," according to political economist Philip Verwimp.150 In the
case of umuganda, Hutus and Tutsis were instructed to report to
communal labor sites. 15 1 Tutsis reported to these sites believing that
they were safe havens. 152 Hutus came prepared to kill or were coerced
into killing by assembled mobs and local officials. 153 As Mamdani
describes the situation:
Killings came to be referred to as umuganda (communal
work), chopping up men as 'bush clearing' and slaughtering
women and children as 'pulling out the roots of the bad
weeds' .

. .

. After the slaughter of thousands of Tutsi at the

church ... in Nyakizu, the burgomaster told local people that
burying the dead was required as umuganda.154
Some of the most brutal mass slaughters-such as the killing of
thousands at the Murambi Technical School-required the sort of
coordinated action and oversight made possible by the well-oiled
umuganda system.155
The notion that umuganda would be misappropriated for the
extermination of the Tutsis was not exactly predictable, but it was
always possible. From its inception, umuganda enabled elites to exert
control over citizen labor, particularly that of the impoverished Hutu
masses. It facilitated tracking their movements and disciplining their
behaviors-failure to report to umuganda frequently resulted in censure
and penalty.156 The socio-political practice also provided ammunition
November 12, 1982, in re-establishing an umuganda regime and the organization of the genocide
and explaining that the similarities include a multi-step process).
150. Id. at 30.
15 1. Id.
152. See GOUREVITCH, supra note 78. at 157-58 (stating that although France had intervened
and established so-called "safe zones," thousands of Tutsis continued to be killed in these zones)
MAMDANI, supra note 75, at 194 (stating that the killing of Tutsi was absorbed into the language
of umuganda, or communal work): Verwimp, supra note 95. at 33 (noting that killings took place
in communes).
153. See MAMDANI, supra note 75, at 225 (stating that without the massacres by machetewielding civilian mobs, numbered in the hundreds and thousands, there would have been no
genocide); see also COLIN M. WAUGH, PAUL KAGAME AND RWANDA: POWER. GENOCIDE AND

THE RWANDAN PATRIOTIC FRONT 78 (2004) (analyzing the life of Paul Kagame, who ascended
to power after the genocide was over and noting that in roughly one hundred days time, an
estimated one million Rwandans died).
154. MAMDANI, supra note 75, at 194. A burgomaster was a powerful communal (i.e., sector)
official. Id.
155. See Verwimp. supra note 95, at 29-30 (indicating the organization of the genocide had a
similar structure to the umuganda system established by Habyarimana).
156. See MAMDANI, supra note 75, at 194 (noting that umugandu gave rise to power over
entire communities in the name of custom): Verwimp. supra note 95, at 11 (discussing
ruralization and restrictions on movement and stating Habyarimana "followed a consistent policy
to make the peasants stay in the rural areas"). Noting statistical backing for the ruralization
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for Hutu extremists' exterminationist campaign against the Tutsis. 157 In
many ways, umuganda served as a mechanism for efficient slaughter.
Surprisingly, the practice continues today.
2. Umuganda under the Kagame Administration
Despite its connection to the genocide, umuganda was revived shortly
after Rwanda's current Tutsi President, Paul Kagame, took office. Like
his predecessors, President Kagame views umuganda as a way for
citizens to contribute to the nation.15 8 The president empowers local
officials to survey and report back on the participation of local
peasants. 15 9 Currently, the last Saturday of every month is reserved for
umuganda.1 60
Since 2007, the Rwanda Research Group ("RRG")16 ' has studied and
participated in this cultural phenomenon. Our ethnographic field
premise, the author notes that in 1973, 95% of the Rwandan population lived in the rural areas of
the country and in 1993, the percentage was the same. Id. Today the penalties vary; they are
meted out by local administrators. In discussing umuganda penalties with Rwandans over the
past four years, the author has discovered that they range from "nothing," to denial of visas and
other government papers, intimidation and harassment, beatings, and jail time.
157. MAMDANI. supra note 75. at 194 ("The use of the word 'custom' was highly significant.
After all, was not customary obligation supposed to distinguish the indigenous from the
nonindigenous?"); Verwimp, supra note 95, at 20 ("Umuganda also gave the local party and state
officials knowledge and experience in the mobilization of the peasant population. A skill that
was to prove deadly during the genocide.").
158. In the Kagame administration's first major planning document, Vision 2020, the
president declared his intention to capitalize on Rwanda's "plentiful supply of cheap labour ...
[to re-]build infrastructure . . . ." REPUBLIC OF RWANDA. MINISTRY OF FIN. & ECON. PLANNING,
RWANDA VISION 2020, at 12 (2000), available at http://www.gesci.org/assets/files/Rwanda
Vision 2020.pdf. In a subsequent five year plan, umuganda was touted as one of several
"institutions of traditional social organization . . . harnessed for the struggle against poverty."
GOV'T OF RWANDA, MINISTRY OF FIN. & ECON. PLANNING, POVERTY REDUCTION STRATEGY

PAPER 8 (2002), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/prsp/2002/rwa/01/063102.pdf. This
document noted that localized public works were a time-honored means of community selfsufficiency. Id.
159. See Bert Ingelaere, Do We UnderstandLife after Genocide?: Center and Peripheryin the
Construction of Knowledge in Postgenocide Rwanda, 53 AR. STUD. REV. 41, 44 (2010)
(discussing how political favoritism continues under President Kagame's rule). Citizens talk
about the idea of reconciliation as "a program of the state." Id.; SARAH RYAN ET AL., BUILDING
THE CAPABLE STATE: DEFINING GOOD GOVERNANCE IN NEW RWANDA 14-16 (2008)
(explaining the complexities of developing political institutions to curb cronyism and rebuild
social trust).
160. John Gahindiro, Making "Unuganda" More Useful, NEW TIMES (June 2. 2008).
http://www.newtimes.co.rw/index.php?issue=14255&article=6830.
161. The co-researchers and research assistants that have directly contributed to umuganda
projects, ranging from house-building to weed-clearing, include: Anita Balocating. Austin
Berescik-Johns, Katerra Billy. Owen Cortner. and Alejandra Diaz. Others have contributed to
background research and planning, including: Arthur Aguirre, Elisa Espinosa, Tanya Flores,
Darlene Nzorubara. Satoshi Ohno, Pamela Prieto, Lorena Ramos. Sam Rodriguez, Della Saju,
Ashley Thompson. and Jennifer Walker. Research assistants and translators from the NUR have
included: Mugabo Paul, Mahame Andrew, and Kasana Justus.

2012]

Preventing Exterminationism

343

research 1 62 has revealed a complex and contradictory state program that
simultaneously forges both community ties and discord. Umuganda
brings locals-and foreigners-together to solve community problems,
such as insufficient housing for genocide orphans.16 3 The communal
labor also unites heterogeneous members of society, such as the
uneducated and college-educated.1 64 While post-umuganda town hall
meetings commence with highly-orchestrated "sensitizations" on central
government policies,1 65 they also afford a forum for both local
grievances and appeals for mutual assistance. 166
The monthly
gatherings bring neighbors together and strengthen both interpersonal
and communal ties.
162. This research commenced with a rigorous literature review. The review was followed by
semi-structured interviews with Rwandans and development experts in the U.S. and Rwanda prior
to engaging in participant observation of umuganda during the summers of 2009 and 2010. The
initial study design was developed with assistance from Michael Fabricant. Executive Officer of
the Social Welfare Ph.D. Program of The CUNY Graduate Center. Subsequently, study designs
were approved by the Institutional Review Boards ("IRB") of Baruch College, City University of
New York and the University of Texas at El Paso (respectively, in 2007. 2008. 2009, and 2010).
Research funding was provided by the Research Foundation of the City University of New York
and the Department of Communication, College of Liberal Arts, and President's Office of the
University of Texas at El Paso. In addition, dozens of individual donors contributed to the
Rwanda Research Group fund in 2007.
163. Mukagahizi Rose, Kwitabira Umuganda ni Isoko y'Iterambere [Participating in
Community Activities (Umuganda) is the Source of Development]. IMVAHO NSHYA. June 2009.
Translator Mahame Andrew stated that "Umuganda has become the culture of Rwanda . . . ,
adopted [by the] Red Cross, UNDP, UNICEF . . . [;] even foreigners participate in umuganda."
Id.
164. Ephrem Murindabigwi. Abanyeshuri ba Kaminuza Barashimirwa Ibikorwa
by'Umuganda [The University Student Community Activities: Umuganda], ARBORETUM, Sept. 3,
2008. The article contains several passages explaining how umuganda is helping to bridge
distrust between the less-educated and college students, including how
[e]ven the people in the village see [NUR students] as proud people, even fearing
associating with them as they think that they are of high class. Even greeting them,
they take it as a mistake that cannot be forgiven . . . . Alice. who also attended the
monthly umuganda indicated that 'I have seen that [NUR students] can also do
something unbelievable . . . so people are going to be familiar to you, you are good
people and this is confirmed by the executive secretary of RUGARA cell where these
houses are being built.' For him, what university students are doing . . . is showing
him with no doubt that University education is [going toward] the future benefit for
society.
Id
165. At the beginning of an umuganda town hall meeting observed by the RRG in summer
2010, a script produced by the national government was read. The script mainly concerned
election protocols, and it was dispatched with quickly (e.g., no questions were taken) so that the
meeting could proceed to local concerns.
166. For example, at an umuganda town hall meeting observed by the RRG in summer 2009.
sector leaders reported recent thefts (e.g., a stolen motorcycle) and local landowners agreed to pay
for additional night security. At an umuganda town hall meeting observed by the RRG in 2010, a
local woman on crutches appealed to her neighbors for assistance in paying her medical bills.
Older residents quizzed her on her marital status. living arrangements. etc. to ascertain her need,
and then a collection was taken for her benefit.
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Conversely, umuganda is exploited as a disciplinary opportunity by
upwardly mobile local officials. 167 Though the RRG witnessed
numerous opportunities for peasant participation in town hall meetings,
local and national convenersl 6 8-many of whom were appointed by the
presidentl 6 9-controlled both the agendas and flows of conversation at
the people's meetings we observed. 17 0 When these elites criticized
marginalized Hutu peasants,171 we imagined that longstanding
animosities were reinvigorated.1 72 There is insufficient space to report
our full research findings here, but field notes from a house-building
project in umudugudul 73 Karuhinda 1 74 illustrate the complexity of the
umuganda system.

167. For example, at an umuganda town hall meeting observed by the RRG in summer 2009,
officials running the meeting chastised the locals for being late, ignoring the locals' need to fetch
water, cooking materials, etc.. prior to the start of umuganda. At an umuganda town hall meeting
observed in one of Rwanda's poorest umudugudu in summer 2010, nearly all residents readily
presented the notebooks they bought, exclusively, for umuganda attendance registration (i.e., at a
cost of at least two to three days' wages). See Ingelaere. Rwanda Research Group, supra note
159, at 13, 53 (providing further description of umuganda).
168. For example, at an umuganda town hall meeting observed by the RRG in the summer of
2009, a national Army commander was among the four leaders of the local town hall meeting.
169. See An Ansoms, Re-engineering Rural Society: The Visions and Ambitions of the
Rwandan Elite, 108 AFR. AFF. 289, 295 (2009) (noting that the majority of the new Tutsi elite are
ex-refugees (including President Kagame) and suggesting that "[t]he over-representation of Tutsi
ex-refugees in official posts and their detachment from the rural setting" is of concern).
170. This was true at the umuganda town hall meetings the RRG observed. See also Ansoms,
supra note 169, at 293-97 (discussing the differences between the new Rwandan political elite
from the peasants in the countryside and noting that Tutsis hold more of the top political positions
in the country today).
171. For example. such criticism was witnessed by the RRG at a rural umuganda near Huye in
summer 2009.
172. See Bert Ingelaere, Peasants, Power and Ethnicity: A Bottom-Up Perspective on
Rwanda's Political Transition, 109 AFR. AFF. 273, 273 (2009) (analyzing the "life trajectories of
[400] ordinary peasants" since the political transition of 1994 and positing that "the instrumental
stance on ethnic identity adopted by the post-genocide regime is not only erroneous but counterproductive"); Ryan, Peace-building,supra note 140, at 286 (discussing Rwanda's "Vision 2020"
plan for the nation's development and its guiding principal that peace can be achieved through
"policy and institutional praxis"); RYAN, BUILDING, supra note 159, at 13 (noting that the term
umuganda is likely irredeemable in the eyes of the poor and that critics have questioned the use of
unpaid peasant labor as the primary means of rebuilding the nation's infrastructure).
173. An umudugudu is the smallest administrative unit in the Rwandan system. This
particular umudugudu is located in Southern Rwanda near Save, the site of the first Catholic
mission, and the National University of Rwanda in Butare/Huye. For more information on
administrative units and titles, see Shinichi Takeuchi & Jean Marara, Conflict and Land Tenure in
Rwanda (Sept. 1, 2009) (JICA Research Institute, Working Paper No. 1), available at http://jicari.jica.go.jp/publication/assets/JICA-RI WP No.1 2010.pdf.
174. Umudugudu Karuhinda is located in cell Nyakagezi in sector Huye in southwestern
Rwanda, which is relatively near to the Burundian border.
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3. Field Notes from the June 2009 Umuganda in Umudugudu
Karuhindal 75
Umuganda fieldwork commenced in an Indian restaurant in midtown
Manhattan in the spring of 2009. An esteemed Rwandan colleague and
United Nations staffer met to talk about the RRG's upcoming field
research.
After the colleague learned that the RRG would be
studying-and participating in-umuganda in June, he opined that June
would be a good month to participate. During June, the Ministry of
Local Government ("MINALOC") would collaborate with the Ministry
of Health ("MINISANTE") to sensitize the citizenry about family health
during the post-umuganda town hall meetings.
In the days leading up to the June 2009 umuganda, the RRG met with
a district official in Huye. The official confirmed that the national
discussion topic for June was health and that she was awaiting both
instructions from MINALOC and talking points from MINISANTE.
She would then disseminate these messages to local officials. She had
already worked with those same officials to select projects that would
contribute to local development targets' 76 and the national agenda.17 7
She explained, "MINALOC organizes the month-end .

.

. discussions.

Then the districts translate the national discussions for the sectors and
cells. The other Ministries also organize discussions . . . in June the

umuganda discussion topics are about birth planning, malnutrition ...
they come from MINISANTE." She suggested that the districts serve
as more than communication intermediaries between the national
government and local leaders; they provide limited financial support
(e.g., for road-clearing tools such as machetes) and help to educate local
leaders about district projects and priorities. "But the people feel like
they own [umuganda]," she advised toward the end of the meeting.

175. As per the study design and IRB recommendations, no interviewees or sources will be
named in this Article. Though Rwanda has made progress toward democracy, open dissent of
government policies is still risky. See Ingelaere, supra note 172, at 292 ("Although [shadow local
governments are] currently mobilized for the development of the country, it was precisely a
[similar] highly top-down, authoritarian, and non-democratic set of institutional structures and
exercise of power that was of crucial importance in the administration of the genocide."). See
generally Ansoms, supra note 169, at 293 96 (describing Rwandan elite). For a theoretical
treatment of this phenomenon, see Andrew R. Smith, Dialogue in Agony: The Problem of
Communication in AuthoritarianRegimes, 18 CoMM. THEORY 160, 160-61 (2008).
176. These development targets are outlined in imihigos, or local performance contracts. See
Ryan, Peace-building, supra note 140, at 293-94 (describing the mechanics of imihigos and
stating that some of the biggest challenges of implementing the performance contracts are
financing and the bureaucracy involved in getting centrally-controlled resources).
177. For example, in July 2010, nearly all projects related to the presidential elections. In the
summer of 2009. with no major elections or celebrations on the horizon, local officials could
engage their communities in locally-focused initiatives.
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After meeting with the district official, the RRG conducted
interviews with the leaders of local NGOs1 78 and NUR student clubs1 7 9
about umuganda and other citizen-led social change efforts. During
these interviews, RRG members solicited invitations to local umuganda
worksites. On the day of umuganda, one researcher joined leaders of a
women's organization as they built a house in rural Cyarwa; two
researchers helped clean local roadsides (e.g., manual weed clearance)
in-town in Huye; and I made bricks in umudugudu Karuhinda with
members of the District University Student Association Forum
("DUSAF"), a community service club at NUR.
Most of the DUSAF students had grown up outside the district;
umudugudu Karuhinda was not their home. But they felt a duty to
"help Rwandans with their problems," as one DUSAF leader explained.
Each year they surveyed their members and local officials on "who are
the poorest people in the area"iso and then tried to assist as many as
they could. In 2008, DUSAF helped construct houses in four districts.
DUSAF members also taught English and trained elementary school
teachers to use new communication technologies in their classrooms.
They conducted workshops on the benefits of "kitchen gardens," small
planters located outside kitchen windows where "[y]ou can use your
extra dishwater to water the plants!" one member explained
enthusiastically. "In that way, we can help to resolve malnutrition," he
added. For their umuganda initiative, on the last Saturday of each
month, the students had convinced the university to lend them one of
the busses President Kagame had donated-and to pay for the gas.
On the morning of umuganda, we boarded the university bus and
traversed rough rural roads for approximately thirty minutes en route to
our worksite. To pass the time, most of the two dozen students aboard
sang Rwandan Patriotic Army ("RPA") 8 victory songs and love songs.

178. For example, the non-profit organization Duhozanye. See Sarah Ryan & Annie
Balocating, "We Snuck up on the Roof...": The Widows of Duhozanye Rebuild their Community.
I SOC. JUST. WISDOM SERIES 1, 3 (2010) (noting how Duhozanye members challenged cultural
taboos against women engaging in carpentry to rebuild their community).
179. For example. The University Women's Student Association ("UWSA") at NUR which
lobbied the university administration to build a women's dorm. In 2005, according to three
UWSA leaders interviewed by the RRG, half of the first-year women at NUR got pregnant. Most
had spent their first few days away from home walking the streets of Huye in search of a place to
live. As a result, they accepted housing with strangers. In response, hundreds of UWSA
members mobilized a protest and demanded that the University build a new dorm. The RRG
visited that dorm in 2009.
180. According to a DUSAF leader interviewed by the RRG in summer 2009.
181. The RPA is the Uganda-based Tutsi army that invaded Rwanda in 1990. Though the
RPA stopped the genocide in 1994. there is dispute about whether the army maintained an
intention to liberate the Hutu majority. See MAMDANI, supra note 75. at 234 (describing a mass
Hutu exodus from Rwanda following the RPF victory). Thus, as I was listening to the singing, I
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We parked a short walk from umudugudu Karuhinda at around 8:15
a.m.
We were directed to the local community house, a mud-walled
structure of approximately 200 square feet, to collect materials. Most of
us hauled wooden brick-making forms to mud pits down a hill behind
the community house. We surveyed the community's previous work
and started piling up cement block-sized mud bricks.
Military
personnel and a few local men began breaking up large plots of dried
mud with hoes. 182 Local women soon poured water into the plots from
the ubiquitous yellow plastic jugs seen in most Rwandan households.
Within an hour, the remaining local participants arrived. 183 The largely
impoverished peasant populationl 84 dove into the grueling manual
labor.
During the four-hour communal labor session, it was often unclear
who was in charge.1 85 A local official in a starched plaid shirt made
notes, seemingly about attendance and work effort, while the DUSAF
students directed me to tasks. Despite the lack of clear direction, we
made hundreds of mud-and-straw bricks. At the post-umuganda town
hall meeting, the local official claimed that we made 800 bricks at a
value of approximately 24,000 Rwandan francs, or 48 U.S. dollars.
Given what I had seen, the estimate of bricks seemed high; the value for
wondered if there were Hutu students in the mix. I was curious how they felt about the RPA.
Survey research conducted at NUR and the Kigali Institute of Education in the summer of 2010
revealed that a majority of the students were the children of poor farmers and. likely. Hutu. See
Sarah Ryan. Social Mobility through Higher Education (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author) (noting a demographic profile that suggests that students in the bottom tier of Rwanda's
public higher education system are Hutu and have opportunities to succeed).
182. The nation was celebrating "Army Week" and members of the army were pitching in at
umuganda sites. Press Release, Ministry of Defence of Rwanda, Army Week (June 26 July 18,
2009). available at http://www.mod.gov.rw/?AR-MY-WEEK-26-June-18-July-2009.
183. It is likely that many local participants were delayed by their morning chores. While
traveling through the main part of umudugudu Karuhinda, I noticed residents at work. They were
tending to small plots of crops, small children, etc.
184. The simple. worn clothing of most participants (e.g.. skirts made from bolts of cloth for
most of the local women, lack of shoes for many children), the conditions of their homes (e.g., tin

roofed, stick-walled structures), and other visual indicators suggested that this was not an affluent
umudugudu. I did not expect it to be, given its rural southern location (i.e.. not in the more
affluent capital city) and DUSAF's selection of the location as a site in need of assistance. Given
visual observations and the lack of alternative employment opportunities in this area of the
country, it is likely that most participants were crop farmers. See generally DE LAME. supra note
103, at 170 (describing rural Rwanda). It should be noted that the vast majority of Rwandans
(more than 85%) engage in farming, largely of a subsistence nature. See THE REPUBLIC OF
RWANDA. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND POVERTY REDUCTION STRATEGY, 2008-2012, at 5-8

(2007) (noting that agriculture provides most employment but that there has been a structural shift
towards the service sector); see also Ansoms, supra note 169, at 289 99 (describing conditions in
rural Rwanda).
185. RRG members noted this same lack of coordination at a summer 2010 umuganda in
Kigali.
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the collective labor of more than 100 people, low. According to the
post-umuganda meeting leaders, that value would have been higher had
locals taken umuganda more seriously.
The town hall gathering was held in a dirt clearing near the
community house. At least two hundred residents were in attendance,
mostly women.
The meeting was presided over by the local
administrator, a representative of DUSAF, a national army commander,
and a police commander. The local administrator, who had not
performed any manual labor that day, opened by thanking everyone for
coming, especially the police, army personnel, students, and foreign
visitor (i.e., me). He led the locals in a chant of "We work hard so we
can develop." 86 He then appraised the day's effort: "Today we have
made 800 bricks .

. .

. We would have made more than 1,000, but you

have come late. But still, I thank you for coming." The DUSAF
representative spoke next.
The DUSAF student spoke confidently, despite being younger than
most of the umudugudu residents and originally hailing from
Uganda.1 87 He began by situating the students' contribution in a larger
narrative of communal self-help: "These students have a lot of work to
do.... But they help you because of love ... so we can solve our own
problems. We have many homeless, but we will join hands and
construct houses for them." He then seconded the local official's
appraisal of the peasants' lackluster performance: "Even if you have
done good, I can't go without talking about your weakness. We have
come early, but you have come late. So we've made fewer bricks. If
you were on time, we might have constructed a house this week."1 88 He
then responded to perceived prejudice against university students,
stating, "We at NUR are not as proud as before. Before ...

we would

not work physically. But we can do this work too." He ended by
attempting to rouse the crowd with a "Do you agree to be on time?"
The locals responded weakly, "Yes." Then the army and police
commanders spoke in turn.

186. Translation assistance was provided by two NUR students during the meeting. The
quotes presented in this Article are rough translations gleaned from the author's field notes.
187. Anthropologist Bert Ingelaere would likely contend that the speaker's Ugandan
background gave him confidence. According to Ingelaere's extensive research of social and
political capital in Rwanda, Ugandan-born Tutsis hold more power than their Rwandan-born
compatriots, especially Hutus. See Ingelaere, supra note 172, at 275 (noting that socio-political
distinctions between Hutus and Tutsis are as prevalent as ever). It should be noted that, given our
visual observation of this student's accommodations (members of the RRG saw the room he was
renting), he was very poor.
188. It would have been impossible to construct a house that day. The previous month.
participants had made less than half the bricks needed for a house. Those bricks had dried and
were ready to assemble, but the bricks we made would take more than a few hours to dry.
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Both security officials reiterated the previous speakers' messages,
thanking the locals for attending and admonishing them for their subpar
effort. The army commander equated their lateness with a lack of
patriotism, explaining: "This country was destroyed by the people of
Rwanda. We must rebuild it. If you come late, you do not love your
country .

. .

. We beg you to report on time .

. . ."

He then turned to me

as an example, as the other speakers had done, suggesting that the locals
had ruined my opinion of their umudugudu or nation: "She worked
hard. She had come to do research on umuganda, but you came late.
What picture does she take away?" And, with that, he ended his speech.
And so, another umuganda Saturday unfolded in umudugudu
Karuhinda. Bricks were made, attendance taken, recalcitrance noted,
and residents disciplined. Of course, this is only a snapshot of what
unfolded for the tens of thousands who participated in umuganda that
day. Still, the activities and messages described in this short field report
illustrate how modern umuganda both brings community members
together and reinforces elites' power over them.
Umuganda is touted as labor for a common good, but the work has
deeper meanings.
For many peasants, umuganda is a monthly
opportunity to earn forgiveness-even though most have nothing to be
forgiven forl8 9 -and demonstrate allegiance to the state. It is their
opportunity to literally be counted as eager citizens in the new Rwanda.
But as administrators are tallying participants, many locals are adding to
their list of grievances against the president and the Tutsis.190 And, in a
region with recurring pogroms and genocides, such simmering
animosities are harbingers of violence. Thus, despite the economicl 9 1
and social benefits of umuganda, it remains the withered appendage of
an age-old system that has brought the nation far more pain than
healing.192 In the end, umuganda functions more effectively as a

189. Though many Rwandans and Central Africans participated in the Burundian and
Rwandan genocide. the majority did not steal, kill, or otherwise occasion harm to their neighbors
directly. For an overview, see Davenport & Stam, supra note 79.
190. See Ingelaere, supra note 172, at 290 (noting that all citizens have access to authorities
but that the "dominant political order serves to guarantee physical safety for Tutsi genocide
survivors or Tutsi returnees"); see also Ansoms, supra note 169, at 293 97 (describing Rwandan
elites); Danielle Beswick, Managing Dissent in a Post-Genocide Environment: The Challenge of
PoliticalSpace in Rwanda, 41 DEV. & CHANGE 225. 244 (2010) (describing the complex politics
of Rwanda).
19 1. At the after-umuganda town hall meetings, leaders often reveal the economic impact of
the labor. At the featured umuganda. our work had yielded less than fifty dollars worth of labor.
Our research team witnessed small-scale returns at a half-dozen umuganda sites, though leaders
estimate far greater economic and social benefits. See also Ryan & Balocating, supra note 178, at
1 (describing community efforts and organizations such as the Duhozanye NGO).
192. See Verwimp. supra note 79. at 233 (noting a history of government-sponsored
repression and political favoritism in Rwanda).
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metaphor for reconciliation than as an institution of social good. And,
like other citizen control systems, umuganda has the potential to oppress
many as it empowers a few. But if umuganda evinces a shortcoming in
modern Rwandan administration, it also reveals an opportunity for the
nation to advance, and for its primary ally-the U.S.-to lend support
and keep its promises.

IV.

FULFILLING THE U.S. OBLIGATION TO PREVENT EXTERMINATION BY
DISMANTLING SYSTEMS OF GENOCIDE IN RWANDA, THE U.S., AND
BEYOND

Citizen control systems such as umuganda can be dismantled before
they are put to violent ends (again). This belief forms the basis of U.S.
culture and constitutional democracy.193 And though policymakers
have sometimes strayed from this principle, it is the standard that
dictates how and why the U.S. must fulfill its obligation to prevent
exterminationism. In both Rwanda and the U.S., government officials
should begin testing and implementing initiatives to limit government
surveillance and control of the movements, actions, and locations of
their peoples, especially when such oversight is racially or ethnically
targeted. If successful, such limits will deprive future genocidaires of
the means to carry out efficient slaughters. System regulations are also
likely to enhance citizen trust and social cohesion. 194
In Rwanda, the project could unfold collaboratively, with the U.S.
serving as an ally. For instance, the United States Agency for
International Development ("USAID")1 95 could fund Labor Intensive
Public Works ("LIPW"), compensating those who voluntarily
contribute to infrastructure projects. Pilot LIPW projects have proven
promising, and they represent a constructive avenue for U.S.

193. For example, as proclaimed in the opening to the Declaration of Independence, "When in
the Course of human Events, it becomes necessary for one People to dissolve the Political Bands
which have connected them with another, and to assume among the Powers of the Earth, the
separate and equal Station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God entitle them .....
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. I (U.S. 1776). For more on Thomas Jefferson's
"complex . . . eighteenth-century civic understanding of republican institutions and the mutual
interdependence of individual and community . . . " see David Thomas Konig, Thomas
Jefferson's Armed Citizenry and the Republican Militia, I ALB. Gov'T L. REv. 250, 270 (2008).
194. See Helen M. Hintjens. Explaining the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda. 37 J. OF MOD. AFR.
STUD. 241, 241 (1999) (discussing the nature and importance of citizen trust and social cohesion
in Rwanda); see also NAT J. COLLETTA & MICHELLE L. CULLEN, VIOLENT CONFLICT AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF SOCIAL CAPITAL: LESSONS FROM CAMBODIA, RWANDA. GUATEMALA,
AND SOMALIA 33-50 (2000) (noting how the Rwanda case study "examined how social capital

interacted with conflict in terms both of the unraveling of social fabric and the strengthening of
social dynamics among Hutu that enabled the genocide").
195. USAID is the government agency that provides U.S. economic and humanitarian aid
worldwide.
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engagement with the nation. 19 6
Simultaneously, the U.S. could
negotiate with President Kagame to phase out systems such as
umuganda, diminishing the grasp of both the central government and
local administrators over the peasantry. Given President Kagame's
deep ties to Washingtonl 9 7 and his desire to please the donor
community,1 98 he is likely to consider such a request. The peasantry
would immediately feel the impact of a resultant policy shift; such a
shift might also vent some of the peasants' frustrations.19 9 The U.S.
could undertake simultaneous domestic initiatives to demonstrate good
faith and solidarity.
While there is no parallel to umuganda in the U.S., the nation is not
free of systems of oppression and control. Post-9/1 1, a spate of laws
require citizens and visitors to carry increasing amounts of data on
government-issued computer chips (e.g., chips embedded in passports),
furnish identification upon request, and submit to more frequent
196. See JAN-GERRIT VAN UFFELEN, LESSONS FROM SOCIAL PROTECTION PROGRAMMES IN
SITUATIONS OF CHRONIC POVERTY AND FOOD INSECURITY 13-15 (2010) (discussing the
National Labour Intensive Public Works in Rwanda (HIMO)); see also REPUBLIC OF RWANDA
MINISTRY

OF

LOCAL

GOVERNMENT,

NATIONAL

LABOUR

INTENSIVE

PUBLIC

WORKS

(HIMO/LIPW) STRATEGY 4 (2008) (noting that limited LIPW programs commenced at the end
of 1978). Note that LIPW are not always compensated. This Article advocates for paid.
voluntary labor as an alternative to umuganda. The work should also assist individuals and
groups in developing trade skills (e.g.. carpentry skills).
197. The Rwandan president has maintained ties to U.S. backers for nearly a quarter century.
STEPHEN KINZER, A THOUSAND HILLS: RWANDA'S REBIRTH AND THE MAN WHO DREAMED IT

61-68 (2008). In 1990, the president trained at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff
College in Leavenworth, Kansas. United States Defense Intelligence Agency, Biographical
Sketch: Major Paul Kagame (Oct. 1994) (on file with author). Within months of the RPA's siege
of Kigali in 1994, Vice President Kagame visited Washington, D.C. to discuss "the role the
Rwandan Patriotic Army [would] play in reconstruction efforts in Rwanda." Invitation Letter
from William James Perry, Dep't of Def., to Paul Kagame, Vice President, Minister of Def.,
Rwanda (Nov. 1994) (on file with author). During his visit, government officials outlined the
beginnings of U.S. economic investment in Rwanda (e.g.. paying off World Bank debts). United
States Department of Defense, Comprehensive USG Talking Points for Kagame Visit (Dec. 8,
1994) (on file with author). These ties have remained relatively strong in recent years.
198. For a discussion of Kagame's relationship with donors (and vice versa), see Tristan
McConnell, One Man's Rwanda, COLUM. JOURNALISM R., Jan. Feb. 2011, at 39 41, available
at http://www.cjr.org/feature/one-mans rwanda.php, and the extensive responses of journalists
who covered the genocide and aftermath, such as Philip Gourevitch.
199. Rwanda's poor are chiefly frustrated by both increases in the rich-poor gap and
remaining land disputes. According to the United Nations Development Programme ("UNDP"),
"Rwanda's recent growth has largely bypassed the rural poor. leading to a concentration of wealth
at the top of the income distribution, and an increase in the country's Gini coefficient from 0.47
to 0.51 from 2001 to 2006." Press Release, UNDP, The Rwanda National Human Development
Report Urges for a New Push in Investment and Aid to Achieve the MDGs (July 26. 2007) (on
file with author). For a general overview, see Day. supra note 80, at 238-39. Of course.
Rwanda's poor are a diverse group. For a discussion of the various impoverished segments of
society. see AN ANSOMS, RURAL POVERTY AND LIVELIHOOD PROFILES IN POST-GENOCIDE
RWANDA. INST. DEV. POL'Y & MGMT. U. OF ANTWERP 9 (Oct. 2008), available at
http://www.ua.ac.be/objs/001 92837.pdf.
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background and security checks. 2 00 Civil libertarians contend that
many of these new security protocols expand federal and state control
over the population unnecessarily. 2 0 1 Because legal scholars have made
a compelling case for curtailing these laws already, 20 2 this Article will
200. The primary post-9/11 law requiring increased citizen surveillance is the Uniting and
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct
Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) [hereinafter
Patriot Act]. Of course, federal and state identification presentation and data carrying laws predate the implementation of the Patriot Act. See Inger Sandal, Judge Upholds Deputy's Arrest of
Bicyclist Who Didn't Have ID, ARIz. DAILY STAR, Feb. 5, 2001, available at http://azbikelaw
.org/articles/TucsonlD.html. However, increased enforcement has occurred since the passage of
the Patriot Act. During the past decade, the federal government has funded the retraining of state
and local law enforcement professionals to enhance surveillance effectiveness. Such retraining
was the mandate of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 ("IRTPA"),
Pub. L. No. 108-458. 118 Stat. 3638 (2004). IRTPA funneled billions of dollars to state and local
governments to support diverse securitization and citizen control initiatives. Closely following
the passage of the IRTPA, the "REAL ID" Act moved the U.S. one step closer to a national
identification card system by setting federal standards for state identification (e.g.. driver's
licenses). Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror,
and Tsunami Relief, 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 (2005); see also ELECTRONIC
PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER (EPIC). REAL ID IMPLEMENTATION REVIEW: FEW BENEFITS.
STAGGERING COSTS 3-4 (2008) (outlining the creation of the REAL ID system). Recently, these
initiatives have pitted state governments (e.g., Arizona) against the federal government in a clash
over who has the authority to define and lead security efforts. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of
Justice, Office of Public Affairs, Citing Conflict with Federal Law, Department of Justice
Challenges Arizona Immigration Law (July 6, 2010), available at http://www.pmewswire.com/
news-releases/citing-conflict-with-federal-law-department-of-justice-challenges-arizonaimmigration-law-97873369.html (describing the U.S. Department of Justice's brief, which argues
that Arizona S.B. 1070 unconstitutionally interferes with the federal government's authority to set
and enforce immigration policy).
201. For an astute analysis of how increasing access to criminal records is "mak[ing] the
formation of a permanent criminal underclass more likely and intractable," see James Jacobs &
Tamara Crepet. The Expanding Scope, Use, and Availability of CriminalRecords. 11 N.Y.U. J.
LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 177, 213 (2008). For discussions of the problems posed by computer chips
in passports and expanding government access to information and data storage capacities, see
Margaret L. Lorenc, The Mark of the Beast: U.S. Government Use of RFID in Government-Issued
Documents, 17 ALB. L.J. SC. & TECH. 583. 586 (2007); Kyle Sommer. Riding the Wave: The
Uncertain Future of RFID Legislation, 35 J. LEGIS. 48, 49 51 (2009). For a thorough treatment
of how the Patriot Act enables unreasonable searches and seizures because nearly any search can
be deemed anti-terrorism police work, see Christopher Metzler. Providing Material Support to
Violate the Constitution: The USA PatriotAct and Its Assault on the 4th Amendment, 29 N.C.
CENT. L. REV. 35. 53-54 (2006). And for how the Patriot Act has increased racial profiling and
squandered anti-terrorism resources, see Yevgenia S. Kleiner. Racial Profiling in the Name of
National Security: ProtectingMinority Travelers'CivilLiberties in the Age of Terrorism, 30 B.C.
THIRD WORLD L.J. 103, 103 (2010): Priyamvada Sinha, Police Use of Race in Suspect
Descriptions: Constitutional Considerations, 31 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 131, 132
(2006).
202. See, e.g., Sinha, supra note 201. at 132 (noting heightened national security concerns
after the terrorist attacks on September 11. 2001). On the opposite side, legal experts in
information protection and national security have documented how lax regulations open the door
for identity theft. terrorism, and even the financing of genocidal violence. Given that this Article
interrogates systems of exterminationism. arguments in support of the Patriot Act's protective
value (e.g., to prevent international money laundering for genocide) cannot be ignored. Most of
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only briefly describe the pitfalls of a government system that is
seemingly benign but frequently under the radar: the decennial national
census.
While controversy swirls each time the U.S. Census Bureau unveils
new categories or formats, critics typically argue over the substance of
the changes rather than the expansion of power they might suggest, and
few citizens express privacy concerns related to the census. 20 3 After all,
the census is a taken-for-granted government institution, mandated by
Article I of the Constitution. 2 04 But what began as a mechanism for
apportioning taxes has evolved into a means of collecting householdlevel information, including racial and ethnic data. 2 05 And while the
government currently dissociates
individual
addresses from
demographic information and restricts access to census data, 206 it
the "pro-Patriot Act" scholars suggest only that certain provisions within the Patriot Act (e.g., the
Title III anti-money laundering provision) afford protections of the citizenry without undermining
the balance of security and privacy. While recent Rwandan history suggests that governments are
reluctant to relinquish the "bad parts" of police state policies while retaining the "good parts," the
piecemeal pro-Patriot Act arguments are nonetheless an important contribution to the discussion
about how to move forward. See Paul Fagyal, The Anti-Money Laundering Provisions of the
PatriotAct; Should They Be Allowed to Sunset?, 50 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1361. 1361 (2006) (noting
information that can be obtained from investigating accused terrorists' financial networks)
Matthew T. Hovey, Oh, I'm Sorry, Did That Identity Belong to You? How Ignorance, Ambiguity,
and Identity Theft Create Opportunityfor Immigration Reform in the UnitedStates. 54 VILL. L.
REV. 369, 369 (2009) (noting how addressing identity theft can also contribute to discussions of
immigration reform in the U.S.). For a rebuttal to Title III defenses and a case for "Congress to
play an energetic role" in dialing back the wide-reaching Patriot Act, see Laura K. Donohue,
Constitutionaland Legal Challenges to the Anti-Terrorist Finance Regime, 43 WAKE FOREST L.
REv. 643, 696 (2008).
203. See Nancy A. Denton, RacialIdentity and Census Categories:Can Incorrect Categories
Yield Correct Information?. 15 LAw & INEQ. 83, 83 (1997) (expressing concern over the
inadequacy and inaccuracy of the U.S. Census Bureau's racial and ethnic categories); Michael
Omi, RacialInequity Identity and the State: The Dilemmas of Classification. 15 LAW & INEQ. 7. 7
(1997) (discussing issues that state-defined classifications of race create); Eleanor Singer, John
Van Hoewyk, & Randall J. Neugebauer, Attitudes and Behavior: The Impact of Privacy and
Confidentiality Concerns on Participation in the 2000 Census, 67 PUB. OPINION Q. 368, 370
(2003) (noting a study that was able to determine "whether attitudes toward privacy and
confidentiality continued to predict census mail returns in the 2000 census as they had in the
decennial census a decade earlier"). But see David E. Rosenbaum. U.S. Census Returns Roll in
Despite Privacy Criticisms. PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE. Apr. 1. 2000, at A6 (reporting on the
reluctance of some to give census information).
204. Article I, Section 9 states, in part: "No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid,
unless in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be taken." U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 9.
205.

See POPULATION REFERENCE BUREAU, THE 2010 CENSUS QUESTIONNAIRE: SEVEN

QUESTIONS FOR EVERYONE (Apr. 2009). available at http://www.prb.org/Articles/2009/
questionnaire.aspx (noting that the 2010 Census asks for an individual's race and whether he or
she identifies as Hispanic).
206. For example. the New York Census Research Data Center at Baruch College, City
University of New York. is one of nine facilities in the United States in which data is made
available under supervision.
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nevertheless maintains a system capable of efficiently identifying the
racial or ethnic composition of each household.20 7 In the wrong hands
and at the wrong time, this system could contribute to the targeting of
African Americans, Mexican Americans, or some other group
scapegoated by neo-nativists. 20 8
As in Rwanda and other sites of recent genocide, such information
collection seems innocuous, until it is not. Of course, pointing to the
census as a system of oppression might seem the epitome of a straw
argument, but such a reaching inquiry and thorough self-examination is
both justified and necessary if the U.S. is to effectively prevent a future
calamity on its soil. If lawmakers, legal scholars, and/or jurists concur
that the modern census or other information-control systems are
contributing to an overreaching central state, there are ways to curtail
the systems without losing their benefits.
As legal scholar Joel Reidenberg advises, technology provides the
means for concurrently addressing needs for both public information
and privacy. 2 09 For example, policymakers and legal advocates need
reliable data to determine community needs, trends, and even patterns
of discrimination. For instance, to show a trend of discrimination (e.g.,
housing, hiring) against Italian Americans, 2 10 one needs to know their
proportion within a given population and geographic area. But
statistical modeling has advanced to a level that permits reliable

207. For example. while the 2010 short form asked for only seven pieces of information (i.e..
name, sex, age/birthdate. Hispanic ethnicity, race, relationship to person filling out form, other
residence), it recorded more than a count of the citizenry for tax apportionment purposes. Some
would argue that we need this data, for instance. so that we can hire public administrators attuned
to a community's needs. Acceding to that argument does not justify the collection of household
level data on ethnicity and race but, rather, the collection of community-level data.
208. See ROBIN DALE JACOBSON, THE NEw NATIVISM: PROPOSITION 187 AND THE DEBATE
OVER IMMIGRATION 47 (2008) (discussing how stereotypes about Mexican criminality fueled the
Proposition 187 campaign); PETER SCHRAG, NOT FIT FOR OUR SOCIETY: IMMIGRATION AND
NATIVISM IN AMERICA 1 (2010) (noting that the U.S. is a "nation of immigration restrictions,"
and current immigration battles resonate with arguments made throughout U.S. history); see also
Joan Walsh, Everything You Know about the Civil War is Wrong, SALON (June 9, 2011),
http://www.salon.com/news/opinion/joan walsh/politics/2011/06/09/civil war america aflame
(describing the nativism prevalent during the U.S. Civil War).
209. For a defense of privacy rights in the context of genocidal violence, see HANNAH
ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION (1958). For an interesting counter-argument about the
communal value of certain public data, see AMITAI ETZIONI. THE LIMITS OF PRIVACY 103-39

(1999). It is difficult-but possible to balance individual privacy and public information needs.
The lesson of the Rwandan genocide is that both individual and public good were sacrificed to
serve the ends of genocidaires.
210. For example. as statistical data demonstrated in City University of New York ("CUNY")
staff and faculty hiring practices. See Scelsa v. CUNY, 806 F. Supp. 1126 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)
(granting. in the context of an employment discrimination suit, the motion of plaintiff-an
employee of CUNY-for a preliminary injunction against CUNY for engaging in employment
discrimination against Italian Americans).
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extrapolation from non-household data.211 Extrapolating from the racial
or ethnic composition of a school system might suffice to demonstrate a
pattern of discrimination in the larger community, for example.
Although it is beyond the scope of this Article to define the parameters
of such a project, the normative backing for the initiative exists in both
modern social science and in the lessons of history discussed in this
Article and at the Loyola University Chicago Law Journal "Hate
Speech, Incitement & Genocide" Symposium. As a laggardly but
emerging leader in the international effort to prevent genocide, the U.S.
should model appropriate behavior by critically engaging its own citizen
control systems.
V. CONCLUSION

Citizen control systems lay the groundwork for division and
exterminationism. They do so by separating the people, rewarding
government officials with expansive oversight powers, shaping the
rhetoric of citizenship and civic participation, 2 12 and-most
obviously-by training the citizenry to report and perform as instructed
by its government. In the case of Rwanda, umuganda was not the sole
cause of the genocide-no single system of oppression can be held
responsible for the massive loss of life in 1994. But umuganda played
its part. As a seemingly banal public administration instrument,
umuganda was exploited to effectuate the fastest genocide in history.
And while ample evidence suggests that hate speech inflamed genocidal
tendencies and legitimized group violence in the nation and region,
efficient extermination was possible only because citizen control
systems were fully operational.
U.S. lawmakers and jurists should learn from the Rwandan genocide
and commence a thoughtful examination of domestic citizen control
systems. They should ponder: Are these systems uniting us or dividing
us against each other? Are they depriving certain groups of agency,
autonomy, or privacy? Could they provide fodder for exterminationist
campaigns? And lastly, what can we do to ensure that our nation is a
model for the preservation of individual and group dignity?

211. See Ruth Meinzen-Dick, Monica Di Gregorio & Nancy McCarthy, Methods for Studying
Collective Action in Rural Development ii (CAPRi, Working Paper No. 33, 2004) (suggesting
that it is possible to make reliable inferences from community-level data); see also Yiheyis T.
Maru, Ryan R. J. McAllister & Mark Stafford Smith, Modeling Community Interactions and
Social Capital Dynamics: The Case of Regional and Rural Communities of Australia, 92 AGRIC.
SYs. 179, 182 (2007) (analyzing non-household data).
212. See Young. supra note 73, at 92 (explaining how rational republicanism prevents
marginalized individuals from being considered as full citizens by political elites).

356

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 43

Within U.S. legal and academic communities, there is a deep
commitment to such inquiry and to the revitalization of an open society
that safeguards all of its people. 2 13 While we must continue to
deliberate about the timing, sequencing, and unfolding of such
democratic strategies, we can agree that the U.S. has a responsibility to
uphold its Genocide Convention obligations domestically, as well as
internationally.
Whether we adopt a comprehensive approach to
regulating hate speech and dismantling systems of genocide or choose
some other strategy, we must commit to forward progress. Only then
can we realize Raphael Lemkin's dreams for our nation.

213. The Bronx Defenders serves as an apt illustration. It works to promote transparency and
accountability in the South Bronx while also protecting the dignity of clients and the conmunity.
THE BRONx DEFENDERS, www.bronxdefenders.org (last visited Dec. 15, 2011).

